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On October 7, 2003, California Governor Gray Davis became the second Governor in 
American history to be recalled.
1
  Multiple factors contributed to his lack of popularity, from 
natural disasters to record budget shortfalls in the wake of the dotcom bust, but for many the 
tipping point came when he declared that he would be tripling California’s motor vehicle tax to 
shore up the state’s budget.  Most of Davis’s challengers pledged to repeal the increase.
2
   Tom 
McClintock, who came in third in the recall election and now serves as one of California’s 
Representatives, made lowering vehicle taxes the main focus of his campaign.
3
  Eventual winner 
Arnold Schwarzenegger made his feelings on the increase clear by dropping a wrecking ball onto 
a junker with the words “Davis Car Tax” spray painted onto the side.
4
  Governor 
Schwarzenegger reduced vehicle taxes down to their previous levels his first day in office.
5
   
While few can rival California’s penchant for drama, similar debates take place across the 
states that currently levy annual ad valorem taxes on vehicles.  Furthermore, while taxpayers 
have largely resigned themselves to real property taxes, they perennially debate not only vehicle 
tax rates and relief provisions, but also whether or not the tax should be levied at all.   Yet, while 
scholars have done exhaustive studies on the real property tax, as well as the taxation of 
intangible property, they have given little thought to the category between the two – tangible  
                                                            
1 Katharine Q. Seeyle, For Gray Davis, Great Fall from the Highest Height, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/08/us/california-recall-governor-for-gray-davis-great-fall-highest-
height.html?emc=eta1. 
2 Michael Hiltzik, Reversing Car Tax Pledge Is Best Course, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003, at C1.  The tax, used to fund 
local governments, had been lowered in 1998, with the State of California promising to make up the local shortfall.  
Governor Davis’ tax increase restored vehicle taxes to their pre-1998 levels, because the state could no longer afford 
to make payments to its localities.      
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 John M. Broder & Dean E. Murphy, Schwarzenegger Takes Oath and Vows to End Divisions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 





personalty, now taxed mostly in the form of automobiles and the personal property of businesses.    
No doubt part of this lack of attention is due to the fact that taxes on tangible personalty 
make up only a small portion of local revenues,
 6
 with many localities not collecting personal 
property taxes at all.
7
 Taxes on personalty, however, have been a component of local revenue 
since colonial times.  Moreover, in their current manifestation as annual levy on vehicle values 
these taxes have outsized effects upon state and local politics.  As one political analyst puts it, 
“Nothing excites Americans like tax breaks and automobiles.  Thus it is hard to imagine a more 
potent tax proposal than one which lowers the tax on automobiles.”
8
          
This paper will examine the tangible personal property tax in New Haven, with a focus 
on the tax as it is levied on residents rather than businesses.  Part I will trace the history of the tax 
from the cow to the car, focusing on how administrators have dealt with frequent attempts at 
evasion and the challenges involved in having the state set the tax law while localities assess and 
collect the tax.  Part II will examine the tax in its modern form, using a novel application of the 
theory of tax morale to local taxation, showcasing why the vehicle tax is so controversial, and  
arguing that it should be locally controlled.  Part II then evaluates the tax from a local finance 
perspective, adapting the benefits tax framework to personal property and arguing that vehicle 
tax may increase local government efficiency by acting as a benefits tax for renters.  Part III 
concludes with a roadmap for implementing local control of the vehicle tax in Connecticut.       
                                                            
6 Neither the Census of Governments nor the Tax Foundation distinguish personal property taxes from real property 
taxes in their regularly-gathered statistics, with the result that inter-state data his difficult to come by.  Two 
exceptions are a special report in the 1957 Census of Governments, Frederick L. Bird, Public Administration Service, 
The General Property Tax: Finding of the 1957 Census of Governments, and a 1998 report, Scott Mackey & Mandy 
Rafool, State and Local Value-Based Taxes on Motor Vehicles, 14 STATE TAX NOTES 541 (1998).   
7 In Connecticut, for example, taxes on motor vehicles make up about ten percent of local tax revenue.  See Report 
of the State of Connecticut Blue Ribbon Commission on Property Tax Burdens and Smart Growth Initiatives, 30 
(2003).   
8 Laura A. Wheeler, An Analysis of the Economic Consequences of Modifying the Property Tax  on Motor Vehicles 





Part I: The Tangible Property Tax in New Haven’s History 
 
A. Taxation in Early New Haven and Early Connecticut: 1638-1818 
  
Personal property taxes have been levied in New Haven since 1649 when the General 
Court adopted Massachusetts’s tax code, which included taxes upon livestock.
9
   In fact, 
livestock taxes were a large part of the reason why New Haven adopted a new tax system.  The 
Colony had previously levied taxes almost exclusively upon farmland,
10
 but many of its large 
landholders had invested heavily in failed ventures during the dozen years in which the 
settlement had been active.
11
  They complained that they were unable to pay their taxes, while 
others with little land had become more prosperous but contributed less to the general coffers.
12
   
The Massachusetts Code addressed their complaints by instituting a poll tax on all adult 
males, levying a “faculty tax” meant to reach the wealth of merchants and professionals with 
little land,
13
 and listing livestock at a much higher value than land.
14
 All lands were listed at 20 
shillings per acre, while livestock were listed at anywhere from ten pounds (horses three years 
old or older) to eight shillings (goats one year old or older) depending upon their species and 
                                                            
9 FREDERICK ROBERTSON JONES, HISTORY OF TAXATION IN CONNECTICUT, 1636-1776, 20-21 (1896).    
10 There were two exceptions.  First, if any free planter chose not to accept a land allotment, he was to be taxed a flat 
rate of 1 shilling per year. RECORDS OF THE COLONY AND PLANTATION OF NEW HAVEN, FROM 1638-1649, 186, 199 
(Charles J. Hoadly, ed., 1857) [hereinafter RCNH I].    Second, wealthy traders and merchants were to be taxed 
periodically as the town saw fit, because they owned little land and would thus escape taxation. Id. at 199.  
11 Farmland had been apportioned in New Haven based upon the size of one’s family and the size of one’s estate.  Id. 
at 92.  As a result, the tax indirectly reached wealth as measured at the time lands were given out.  However, many 
of New Haven’s wealthiest citizens had invested large sums in establishing a trading post along the Delaware River.  
They bought lands in the area from nearby Indian Tribes, but the Dutch and Swedes, who also claimed the area, 
eventually drove them away.  See JONES, supra note 9, at 20 (“On account of the failure of the Delaware Company, 
those individuals who were rich in 1640 became impoverished, and possessing more land than their neighbors, who 
had accumulated personal property rather than real estate, the burdens of the land tax bore heavily upon them.”)   
12 RCNH I 448.  The General Court also heard the complaint that large families were unable to pay their taxes on 
account of having been given so much land.  Historians seem to have ignored this argument, likely because it is less 
convincing than the first: far more land was given out to the rich than to those with large families.     
13 The faculty tax was essentially an income tax adapted to a property tax system: merchants and professionals were 
to have their businesses set on the list at an amount that would lead them to be taxed on their gains, as property was 
supposed to be set on the list according to the gains that it would bring in.  See JONES, supra note 9, at 25-26.   






  These values were roughly based on the worth of land and livestock, as measured by the 
amount of food and basic goods that they could produce in a year.
16
  The livestock tax thus 
allowed New Haven to better reach the wealth of its residents.
17
  It also would have been familiar 
to settlers, having been levied in England since the Middle Ages.
18
  Livestock taxes were also 
justified under the theory that tax was paid in return for government benefit.  Men were taxed, in 
the form of a poll tax, for the protection that government afforded them.
19
  Likewise, property 
was taxed for the protection that government afforded it.  This benefit theory of taxation left little 
room for redistribution of wealth as a virtue of the tax system.  The Colonists, however, seem to 
have been untroubled by this fact.  At the time, poverty was often seen as the result of moral 
failings, and charity was primarily the work of the church.
20
  As the church was tax-supported, 
some level of redistribution existed in the colonial system;
21
 poll tax abatements were also given 
                                                            
15 One pound is the equivalent of 20 shillings, meaning that a full-grown horse and ten acres of land were taxed 
equally. After much debate, New Haven decided to tax houses based on imputed rental value. See Appendix A. 
Connecticut exempted houses from taxation entirely in 1664, but reinstated the tax a few years later. By 1771, 
houses were taxed based upon the number of fireplaces inside.  See Arthur F. Potter, Taxation System of Connecticut 
in 1776, 23 BULL. OF THE NAT’L TAX ASSOC. 130, 136 (1938). 
16 See, e.g., JENS PETER JENSEN, PROPERTY TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1931).   
17 See, e.g., EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 16-17 (8th ed. 1915) (noting that taxes on productive 
property were the basis for taxation in New England, but not in the southern colonies which tended to use excise 
taxes and shy away from poll tax, which would have in effect been a tax on slaves.)   
18 See, e.g., JENSEN, supra note 16, at 23. The tax on livestock dates back to the Danesgeld.  Originally a bribe paid 
to the Vikings in exchange for not raiding villages, it eventually turned into an annual levy.   
19 See, e.g., JONES, supra note 11, at 15 (The duty of every citizen to contribute his share in the support of the 
colonial government was very clearly set forth in the Code of Laws…. This duty… was based upon the theory of 
benefit received by reason of the existence of the government.  The amount of the contribution was determined by 
the ability of the inhabitant to pay, and his ability, by the amount of land and property he possessed, while every 
able-bodied freeman was required to pay a specified sum as a poll tax.);  Potter, supra note 24, at 135 (“There 
should be a stiff tax on persons in return for the protection afforded them and a stiff tax on property in return for the 
protection afforded it.  Since all persons received equal protection from the government the personal or poll tax 
should be equal on all.  Since property ownership varied, the tax on property should vary according as one’s 
ownership of property varied.  So agreed the political economists of the day as they elaborated the now almost 
universally discarded Benefit Theory of taxation.”).  For New Haven’s poll tax rate, see Appendix A.   
20 See, e.g., David Villar Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A 
Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 131, 152-52 (2000); 
Note, The Enforcement of Charitable Trusts in America: A History of Evolving Social Attitudes, 54 VA. L. REV. 
436, 440 (1968). 
21 In early New Haven, people were taxed to support the Congregationalist church; ministers also received special 




for men who were sick and disabled and thus could not work.
 22
  The early New Haven records, 
however, give no evidence of a desire to tax the rich at higher rates than the poor.   
1. Colonial-Era Tax Administration 
 
In the 1650s, New Haven had two levels of tax: town taxes and colony taxes.  Both were 
based off the same list of ratable property.
23
  Taxes were levied as of a specific date – August 
twentieth throughout most of the colonial period.
24
  Towns elected listers each year to take an 
account of all the adult males in their towns and to ask all families for a list of their land and 
livestock.  As property was set on the list at a fixed amount rather than as a percentage of its 
value, listers could with little effort turn an account of each family’s property into a Grand List 
of all the taxable property in their town.
25
  All town lists together served as the Colonial Grand 
list.
26
  The colonial government would set a Colony tax rate, normally one penny for every 
pound of property on the list.
27
  Each family would pay their share of the grand list to their town 
constable, who then remitted the money to the colonial government.
28
   Towns, and eventually 
parishes, counties, and school districts also levied taxes using the town grand list or portions 
thereof.  As a result, although the Colony controlled what classes of property were set on the 
                                                            
22 See, e.g., RCNH I, 500.  
23 See Appendix A.  
24 See Potter, supra note 15, at 131. 
25 JONES, supra note 11, at 9.  The faculty tax, of course, was more difficult to assess.  The result seems to be that 
listers deferred to businessmen and professionals, essentially allowing them to set their own taxes.  Id. at 26.      
26 Originally, one lister per town was selected to give the list to the General Court and to serve as inspector of the list.  
In 1796, the law was changed and listers instead gave the list to the state comptroller, who with the state treasurer 
drew up the State grand list.  Henry F. Walradt, The Financial History of Connecticut from 1789 to 1861, 17 CONN. 
ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCI 1, 21 (1912).   
27 This is the rate set out in the Code of 1656, but the General Court often levied double rates or early rates, 
especially in times of war.  See JONES, supra note 4, at 41 (describing the high taxes levied during King Phillip’s 
War).      




grand list at what rates, it was almost completely dependent upon the town listers for revenue.
29
  
The towns, however, had more leeway in revenue raising.  New Haven relied upon fines and fees 
to supplement its taxes.
30
  In addition, it often levied what were in essence special assessments, 
where those who would benefit most from an improvement were asked to pay for a portion.
31
     
2. Colonial-Era Tax Evasion 
It is probably no accident that the first penalties for failure to list property were designed 
to punish those who had not been listing their cattle.
32
  Though livestock constituted a large part 
of colonial wealth, the livestock tax was relatively easy to evade. First, while land and adult men 
were difficult to hide, livestock could be moved elsewhere just before listing day.
33
  It could also 
be sold or butchered immediately before.  Second, many people wintered their cattle in different 
towns, or in areas outside of town boundaries, and town listers had no way of discovering far-off 
property.
34
  Third, it would have been easy to list livestock as younger than they were in order to 
pay less tax, or avoid it all together.
35
  Most of these flaws in the tax can be directly attributed the 
fact that livestock, as movable property, increased opportunities to evade tax - opportunities  
                                                            
29 Indirect taxes and tonnage duties were also levied, mostly at the colonial level, but formed only a miniscule part 
of the colonial revenue. Id. at 53.   
30 Residents could be fined for failing to report to the watch, or for arriving late to church. The fine for both offenses 
was one shilling.  Id. at 33, 310. In addition to paying any court-ordered fines for their crimes, convicted criminals 
had to pay the town Marshall one shilling for the privilege of being put in jail.  Id. at 83. 
31 For example, erecting fences was often a joint venture between the town and those whose land was being fenced. 
Id. at 61. Often, the town would pay for half the cost of fencing in land, with the owners of the newly enclosed land 
would pay the other half plus the cost of maintaining the fencing.  Bridges could be financed by requiring those 
living nearby to give money and labor; they could in turn be rewarded with extra fishing rights. Id. at 143.   
32 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT FROM AUGUST 1689 TO MAY 1706, 80 (Charles J. 
Hoadley, ed., 1868) [hereinafter CT PUB. REC. 4] (“[I]t is now by this Court ordered that such catle as are left out of 
the list shall be forefeited, or the value of them as they are valued in the list of estsates, prouided all such complaints 
be prosecuted within one twelue moneth after such neglects of forfeitures.”).    
33 JONES, supra note 11, at 36. 
34 Unincorporated lands were supposed to be taxed by the town closest to them, but apparently frequently escaped 
taxation.  See CT PUB. REC. 9, 208, in which the General Assembly changes the law in 1728 to make owners list 
their livestock in the towns where the owners live, in part because of the frequency of tax evasion.   
35 The Code of 1656 had complex rules for when an animal less than a year old was to count as a year old for tax 




which the colonists were more than happy to look for and exploit.
36
   
Colonists could also exploit administrative weaknesses in the rating system.  Tax 
collection was relatively easy unless a taxpayer moved to another town: the collectors could 
auction off property and jail debtors, and were willing to do so because they had to pay out of 
their own funds to make up for any uncollected taxes.
37
  The same could not be said for the 
listing of property, however.  Listers were elected for a one year period, worked only a few days 
out of that period, had little incentive to discover the unlisted property of their neighbors, and 
were not beholden to the colonial government.
38
  These problems remained even after New 
Haven Colony was subsumed by Connecticut in 1664, as Connecticut had also adopted the 
Massachusetts tax code and had the same grand list system.
39
  Sometimes, a town lister would 
simply fail to rate the cattle in his town, or would fail to appear and present a list to the General 
Court.
40
   In 1705 the Colonial government enacted a four-fold penalty system, punishing 
evaders by taxing them four times the normal rate on the property they had failed to list and 
                                                            
36 Potter, supra note 15, at 167.  For example, in 1702 the law was changed to exempt one horse per soldier, for use 
in military service.  In 1792, stallions and stud horses were rated much higher than other horses – at $67 as opposed 
to $10.  By 1799, the General Assembly had to amend the law to specify that soldiers could not use their stud horses 
as their one tax-exempt horse. 
37 Town constables, and later locally-elected collectors, had the power of distress.  They could auction off property, 
take land, and jail people, in that order, to recover unpaid taxes. If, as occasionally happened, the constable or 
collectors were found to be insolvent, the selectmen of the town would have to pay and be reimbursed by the town. .  
JONES, supra note 11, at 47-51.  Collection was surely more difficult in times of high taxes, but by the end of the 
18th century, almost all tax was collected by six months after it was due. Oliver Wolcott, Jr., Direct Taxes, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 100-4 (1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLASS III FINANCE 414, 423, 426-27, 431 
(Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Gales & Seaton 1832).   
38 No mention is made of payment for the listers in the early records, nor of travel expenses for the one lister from 
each town unlucky enough to be tasked with bringing his town list to the colonial seat.  The first remuneration 
appears to have been made in 1789, and was set at 2 shillings and six pence for every thousand pounds on the grand 
list.  Potter, supra note 15, at 173. 
39 Id. at 21.  
40 For example, in 1676, Stratford’s listers omitted cattle from their town list. CT PUB. REC. 3, 3.  In 1682, 
Stonington failed to turn in their list, Id. 113, and in May 1690 its townspeople were preventing the town constable 
from collecting the colony tax, CT PUB. REC 4, 24.  New London, which by 1703 was a prosperous town of 298 adult 
men and had the third-largest town grand list in the colony, was a serial offender. It failed to turn it is town list in 
1689, 1697, and again in 1700. Id. 4, 9, 237.   In 1704, it was reported that some towns had not been assessing 




rewarding listers by giving them half of the extra tax.
41
 Even with the new penalty, however, 
there is evidence that evasion was widespread and that townspeople viewed evaders with some 
sympathy.  The colonial records include multiple cases where a lister found unlisted property, 
but the town officials refused to assess the four-fold fine.
42
   
Personal property taxes in the Colonial period were thus plagued with two related 
problems.  First, the taxes were easy to evade.  Second, although the Colony set colony-wide tax 
laws and decided what property should be taxed, local listers had de facto control over what was 
set on the Grand List, making evasion even easier.  Today, New Haven and other Connecticut 
localities continue to wrestle with these same two basic problems.      
B. Towards a General Property Tax: 1818-1860 
By the beginning of statehood, tax rates had gone up, both to pay for the Revolutionary 
War and to pay for increased local services – New Haven, for example, created its first fire 
department and board of health in the 1780s.
43
  At the same time, however, residents again began 
to complain that the tax system was failing to reach wealth.  Land and livestock were set on the 
grand list at rates that were meant approximate their annual productive capacity.
44
  In an 
                                                            
41 The lister, or whoever had discovered the evasion, originally received three-fourths of the four-fold rate.  One 
fourth went to the public purse. Later, the law was changed so that half the penalty went to whoever had caught the 
fraud, and half went to the colony. JONES, supra note 11, at 33.    
42 For example, in 1718 Guilford listers found unlisted property of 336 pounds, but town selectmen unilaterally 
abated the rates.  The listers complained to the general assembly because they did not get their portion of the four-
fold assessment, and the assembly reversed the abatement.  CT PUB. REC. 6, 73.  Similar events took place in 1758 
in Stonington, and 1759 in Wallingford.   In May of 1747, listers made an 8000 pound four-fold assessment, and the 
justices and selectmen of the town abated it rather than allow the listers to collect.  The case was complicated by the 
fact that the Justices were among the people that the listers had found fraudulently hid taxable property, and the 
General Assembly appointed outside men to investigate.  CT Pub Rec. 9, 368.  In 1761, a Fairfield man went so far 
as to make up a fraudulent lease document to try and escape paying a four-fold fine.   
43 MICHAEL SLETCHER, NEW HAVEN: FROM PURITANISM TO THE AGE OF TERRORISM 46 (2004).  
44 The rating system for land had been refined over the years: Land was broken down by type (pasture land, cropland, 
meadowland etc.) and was set on the list at different rates based on type and the area of the colony in which it was 




agricultural economy, this would have been the same as their capital value.  With land starting to 
be used for new, commercial purposes, however, the rating system broke down and livestock 
bore a heavy part of the tax burden even as they became a less important source of wealth.  By 
1796, Connecticut’s tax revenue was comprised of about 39% polls, 27% real estate, and 29% 
livestock, with cattle alone making up 21% of the total Grand List.
45
  The faculty tax, which 
should have acted somewhat as a corrective by requiring listers to assess the value of businesses 
and professional firms, brought in little revenue.  This was likely because listers habitually 
deferred to businesses’ own estimates of their worth.
46
     
The General Assembly added more categories of personal property to the grand list – 
including clocks, watches, silver plate and carriages
47
 – likely in the hopes that taxing the 
trappings of wealth would quiet some of the discontent that was starting to build around 
Connecticut’s tax system.  The attempt failed, however: luxury items never made up a large 
percentage of the grand list, and by the beginning of the 19
th
 century, the state grand list was 
declining despite inflation and population growth.
48
  Henry Walradt in his Financial History of 
Connecticut, posits that the list shrunk because men were amassing untaxed forms of wealth such 
as stock, bonds, and cash.
49
  An additional possibility is that their taxable wealth in the form of 
personalty went unlisted.      
By the time Oliver Wolcott Jr. became Governor of Connecticut in 1817, he decried the  
                                                            
45 See Potter, supra note 15, at 132-34.  The remaining five percent of revenue came from personal property such as 
carriages and household goods. See infra, note 47. 
46 Id. at 134.   
47Coaches, Chariots and Phaetons were among the highest-rated items on the tax list, coming in at $168, $134, and 
$100 respectively.  They did not, however, make up a very large percentage of the grand list revenue, either because 
of evasion or because not very many coaches and carriages existed at the time.  Walradt, supra note 14, at 22-23.   
48 The 1796 grand list was $5,890,883, and it declined most years after that, until it was just $5,559,784 in 1818.  Id. 
at 27. 




tax system as “ancient” and pointed out that industry and the increased use of stock and bonds 
meant that it failed to get at residents’ ability to pay.
50
  In 1818, Wolcott instituted sweeping tax 
reform.  All property was assessed at a percentage of its market value, instead of being listed at a 
set rate.
51
 Different classes of property were treated differently at first, with luxury items such as 
silver plate and clocks taxed at 50% of their value and carriages at 40%.  By 1824, however, all 
property was divided into only two classes: real property, which was assessed at 3% of its value, 
and personal property, which was assessed at 6%.  In 1850, the law was changed once again, 
with all property set on the grand list at 3% of its value.
52
   
The switch to taxes based upon property value was accompanied by administrative 
difficulties for the town listers.  They became, in name as well as duty, assessors.
53
  Responsible 
for evaluating all taxable property in their towns, they were still elected for a one-year term only, 
and worked only a few days of the year.
54
  The result was wide variation in real property 
assessments across the towns, leading Connecticut in 1820 to create a board of equalization to 
                                                            
50 Id. at 61 (quoting Manuscript of Governor Wolcott’s Message to the May Session of the General Assembly (1817) 
at pp. 4-7).  Wolcott was no stranger to fiscal policy: George Washington had appointed him to succeeded 
Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury in 1795.  In 1796 he drew up a report for the U.S. House of 
Representatives surveying all direct taxes levied by the states.  He resigned his Treasury post in 1800, following a 
smear campaign against him in which he was accused, among other things, of setting fire to the State Department 
building. He spent several years as a businessman in New York, which had not levied direct taxes since 1788, before 
returning to Connecticut as a farmer – an experience which may have been enlightening, as it was farmers who bore 
the brunt of Connecticut’s tax.  Nation Governor’s Association, Governor’s Information, Connecticut Governor 
Oliver Wolcott Jr., available at 
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.29fab9fb4add37305ddcbeeb501010a0/?vgnextoid=095a224971c8101
0VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD. 
51 When rating real estate, listers (now assessors) were to take its use into account.  Houses were listed at 2% of their 
value, land at 3%, and stores, mills and other buildings used for business at 3%.  Professions were still assessed at 
the discretion of the assessors.  Horses, mules, and asses were rated at 8%, cows and cattle at 6%.  Other livestock 
were exempt from taxation.  Walradt, supra note 26, at 63-64. 
52 In 1860, the law changed again, with all property to be put on the list at its full value. Walradt, supra note 26, at 
113. 
53 The term “assessor” was first used by the General Assembly in 1777 to describe those listers who dealt with the 
faculty tax, and thus had to determine the value of a business or professional enterprise.  Potter, supra note 15, at 
172.  




make up for the worst of the discrepancies.
55
  As for personal property, assessors essentially 
relied upon the honor system.  Any other solution would have either required assessors to go into 
people’s homes and appraise their goods, or would have required a registration system well 
beyond the capabilities of the time and certainly beyond the capabilities of the assessors.  
C. The Rise and Fall of the General Property Tax: 1860-1956 
 
From 1820 to around 1860, states changed their laws and constitutions to require that all 
property be assessed according to its value and taxed at a uniform rate.
56
   The impetus for this 
movement, according to scholars, was the rise of Jacksonian Democratic ideals.
57
  Universal 
taxation was linked to universal (white male) suffrage and the conviction that all should be taxed 
according to their wealth.
58
 Farmers, who had born the brunt of the previous tax system, ardently 
supported the general property tax.
 59
  Dissenters were few.  Shortly after Connecticut instituted 
its own General Property tax in 1850, New Haven’s grand list was made up of 59% real property, 
17% tangible property, and 17% stocks, bonds, cash and other intangible property.
60
  Cattle, the 
mainstay of the tax system fifty years earlier, now accounted for only $13,162, or 0.068% of the 
grand list.  Coaches, carriages, and pleasure wagons were reported at $62,260, about 3% of the 
                                                            
55 JENSEN, supra note 18, at 360.  By 1851, the treasurer and controller constituted the board of equalization, and had 
a list of enumerated duties. CONN. GEN. STAT. §12-42 (1875).   
56 For a list of such amendments see JENSEN, supra note 18, at 39.  Connecticut is one of the few states in the nation 
that has never codified its tax law in its constitution.     
57 See, e.g., Glenn W. Fisher, The General Property Tax in the Nineteenth Century: The Search for Equality, 6 
PROPERTY TAX JOURNAL 99, 103 (1987).  But see Robin L. Einhorn, Species of Property: The American Property-
Tax Uniformity Clauses Reconsidered, 61 J. OF ECON. HIST. 974 (2001) (arguing that the general property tax was 
championed by slaveholders worried that their slaves would be taxed more heavily than other property, instead of by 
farmers looking towards Jacksonian democratic ideals).  
58 See, e.g., John Joseph Wallis, A History of the Property Tax in America, PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FINANCE 123, 137 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001) 
59 See, e.g., GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX?: A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 23 (1996).  
60 GRAND LIST OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT FOR THE FIRST OF OCTOBER, 1854, PREPARED BY THE COMPTROLLER 






  The bulk of personal property came in the form of merchandise and manufacturing 
equipment.
62
     
The proportion of tax levied upon tangible personalty steadily declined under the general 
property tax – not just in New Haven but across the nation.  Census figures show that tax 
revenue from personalty decreased 24% from 1860 to 1880, while that from realty increased 
87%.
63
  Some of the decrease was natural; intangible property such as stocks and bonds made up 
a greater proportion of wealth, and real estate’s value increased as manufacturing and industry 
created new highest and best uses for land.  However, a portion of the increase was due to 
widespread tax evasion and to routine underassessment of movable property.
64
  In Connecticut, 
moreover, the town-state tax system provided a strong incentive to underassess property of all 
types.
65
  By understating values and then raising the town mill rate to make up for the 
underassessment, towns could minimize the tax their residents owed to the state without 
suffering lost revenue themselves.  As a result, differing rates of underassessment among towns 
was a source of complaint among assessors for decades.
66
   
By the 1870s, such practices were well known.  Tangible property was undertaxed and  
                                                            
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Sumner Benson, A History of the General Property Tax, THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX: ITS HISTORY, 
ADMINISTRATION, AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 53 (George C.S. Benson ed. 1965).  For a more specific example, see 
JENSEN, supra note 18, at 266 (explaining that personalty in New York made up $1,717,295 of the tax list in 1897, 
but declined every year thereafter, except for one, until it was only $50,210 in 1924.).             
64 Id. at 266.   
65 The state-provided school fund once acted as a check on shrinking grand lists, since its dividends were given out 
on the basis of the town lists.  However, in 1819, the General Assembly had adopted a more equitable method of 
giving out school fund dividends, apportioning them based on the number of school age children in each town.   
Walradt, supra note 26, at 81.   
66 See, e.g., MABEL NEWCOMER, SEPARATION OF STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES IN THE UNITED STATES 75-82 (1917); 




unlisted.  Intangible property was even worse: most of it escaped taxation entirely.
67
  Scholars 
began to turn against the general property tax, pointing out that it was almost impossible to have 
a tax that reached all property and reached it only once, given division of ownership interests, the 
fact that property was often owned in many different taxing jurisdictions, and the ease of evading 
tax.
68
  In 1888, Richard Ely, a professor at Johns Hopkins and a member of the Maryland Tax 
Commission, called the general property tax “unnecessarily demoralizing,” saying that it was far 
too tempting to evade, especially when the taxpayer owned personal or intangible property.
69
  
Charles Bullock, an economics professor at Harvard, wrote in 1909 that “In the United States we 
have the proud distinction of possessing about the worst methods of local taxation to be found in 
any part of the civilized world.”
70
  E.R.A Seligman, the most prominent tax scholar of his day, 
echoed Bullock, saying “[t]he general property tax as actually administered is beyond all doubt 
one of the worst taxes known in the civilized world…. It puts a premium on dishonesty and 
debauches the public conscience.”
71
  In theory, the only way to decrease one’s tax burden under 
the general property tax was to become poorer.  In practice, the tax incentivized those with 
movable or intangible property to hide it.  Assessors had neither the inclination nor the means to 
stop evasion and actively engaged in underassessment, with the effect that a tax that had been 
championed as equitable and equal was neither.    
By the end the 19
th
 century, Connecticut, like many state governments, had solved the 
problem of the general property tax at the state level by giving up on it and relying upon other 
                                                            
67 Many scholars note that part of the reason why intangible property escaped taxation so readily was that it usually 
had a clear face or market value, and was thus difficult to underassess, putting it at a disadvantage as compared to all 
other types of property.  See, e.g., E.R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 62 (10th ed., 1928).   
68 See, e.g., JENSEN, supra note 18, at 50-52. 
69 RICHARD T. ELY, TAXATION IN AMERICAN CITIES AND STATES 230 (1888).  The sources in the following 
paragraph are taken mostly from Fisher, supra note 57. 
70 CHARLES JESSEE BULLOCK, A CLASSIFIED PROPERTY TAX 95 (1909).   




sources of revenue instead.
72
  Connecticut drew revenue from an inheritance tax, a corporate tax, 
and a tax on railroads to fund its operations.
73
   If it had sufficient revenue for the year, it did not 
levy a tax on the grand list at all.  In the years when it did levy the tax, the amount was small.  
Although the state continued to set tax laws, taxation of personal property had essentially 
become a local concern.
74
   
States also experimented with a return to classification as a way to solve widespread 
evasion, taxing different types of property at different rates, as Connecticut had done from 1818 
to 1850.
75
  Several scholars, including Simeon Leland, an economics professor at the University 
of Chicago, would later champion the classified property tax movement, positing that many of 
the inequities found in the general property tax could be cured by “adjusting the tax burden to 
varying capacity to pay taxes and varying capacity to evade taxes as between different classes of 
property.”
76
  States began to officially adopt classification provisions as early as 1900.
77
 Some 
amended their constitutions to allow classification, while others were permitted to classify 
because of judicial interpretation of their state laws.
78
 Other states returned to classification in 
fact if not in law: assessors routinely undervalued certain classes of property.
79
  This “illegal 
                                                            
72 Fisher, supra note 56 at 110-114.  It was during this period that scholars began to call for state income taxes.    
73 Treasurer’s Report, Public Documents of the State of Connecticut, Vol. I (1903).  By 1913, the state changed the 
way it collected money from the towns, leaving behind the grand list system and instead apportioning the town’s 
portion of the state tax burden among the towns on the basis of their tax receipts over the previous three years.  State 
officials declared this system much better, since it meant towns no longer had an incentive to keep their grand list 
low but their tax rate high, minimizing their state taxes. Biennial Report of the Tax Commissioner, 1920 and 1921, 
Public Documents of the State of Connecticut.  The state had also relied little upon the town tax in the early 1820s 
and 30s, but started back up again after the state’s financial position worsened, presumably because of the Panic of 
1847.  See Walradt, supra note 26, at 75; Wallis, supra note 58, at 124. 
74 The state tax on towns was eventually repealed in 1947.  Report of the Connecticut State Tax Survey Committee, 
Submitted to the Governor January 3, 1949, 161.    
75 JENSEN, supra note 18, at 173-74. 
76 SIMEON E. LELAND, THE CLASSIFIED PROPERTY TAX IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (1928). 
77 Id., at 423 (setting out in table form a list of all classification amendments to state constitutions from 1900 to 
1928). 
78 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF PROPERTY 95 (1930). 




classification” often received the unofficial approval of the state.
80
  This de facto classification 
seems to have been a response to the two persistent problems of the personal property tax: 
evasion and the state-local divide.  Assessors likely taxed personal property at lower rates as a 
concession to the fact that personal property taxes were so easy to evade.
81
  They also developed 
practices suited to their own towns – taxing different classes of property differently in order to 
best please residents.
82
   
1. The Vehicle Tax as a Local Tax 
 
This, then was the tax climate when the motor vehicle became popular.  By 1908, the 
year the model-T came out, it was immediately taxed as personal property (the Connecticut 
grand list abstracts already had a category labeled “wagons, automobiles, and bicycles”), the 
state had essentially ceded the general property tax to the towns, and scholars had declared the 
tax broken beyond repair.   Taxes on personalty were thought to be especially unworkable, since 
they were easier to evade and since widespread evasion made even honest taxpayers reluctant to 
pay.
83
 At the time, New Haven had a population of around 133,000.  State vehicle registration 
roles for 1910 show about 800 vehicles registered to New Haven addresses, plus two auto 
manufacturers and a handful of auto dealers.
84
 Real property made up 89% of the Grand List,  
personalty about 10%, and intangibles – even easier to hide than personalty – about 1%.
85
   
                                                            
80 See, e.g., LELAND, supra note 76, at 402.   
81 Id. at 412-13.  
82 Id. at 412-13. 
83 See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 67, at 22-28 (giving examples of falling assessments on personalty and 
explaining that one of the problems with the general property tax is “failure to reach personal property. This defect, 
although the most flagrant, perhaps requires the least comment; for it is so patent that it has become a mere byword 
throughout the land.”).  
84 State of Connecticut, Laws Concerning Motor Vehicles and List of Automobiles 1910.   




New Haven at the time was at the forefront of advances in tax collection and assessment.  
Its tax collector was paid a salary of $4000 while most other towns in Connecticut still 
compensated their collectors using a percentage of the money they collected.
86
  In 1910, most 
Connecticut towns still elected assessors for a one year term, had them work only ten to twenty 
days a year, and paid them a pittance.
87
  New Haven, however, paid its five assessors a yearly 
salary of $2000 and had them work the entire year.  They were appointed by the Mayor for 
staggered five-year terms.
88
  This move drew praise from the State Tax Commissioner, who 
noted that longer terms allowed assessors to develop expertise in valuing property, and that 
appointment instead of election insulated them somewhat from the pressure to undervalue the 
property of the politically connected.
89
   New Haven was also at the forefront of motor vehicle 
assessment.  It was one of the first Connecticut cities to use manufacturer values plus set 
depreciation schedules to assess cars.
90
   
By 1917, when the state Joint Committee on Taxation and State Finance issued a report 
on Connecticut’s tax system, the consensus was that personal property taxes were so easy to 
evade as to be hopeless.
91
  Motor vehicles, however, were a different story.  First, they were 
valuable and numerous.  New Haven at the time was home to about 30 car dealers and over 3000 
                                                            
86 State of Connecticut, Information Relative to the Assessment and Collection of Taxes 1908, 7.  
87 Id. at 6, 20.  The average number of days worked for an assessor in Connecticut was 32.  The average pay per day 
was $2.73.   
88 Report of the Tax Commissioner for Biennial Period 1909 and 1910, supra note 85, at 27.  
89 Id. at 27.  
90 Id. at 19.  
91 Fred Rogers Fairchild, Report of the Joint Committee on Taxation and State Finance (1917) (“[T]he present 
method of collection a tax upon various kind of personal property is very nearly a complete failure.  The taxes are 
generally evaded and the operation of the system is most unequal throughout the state and produces numberless 
injustices.”) This Joint Committee report compared the grand lists to the census, finding that personal property was 
both underreported and undervalued.   They also found that the smallest towns listed the largest percentage of 
personal property.  New Haven was particularly bad.  Although Connecticut’s densest city, it was next to last in 






  Second, motor vehicles were harder to hide than other personal property, since each year 
the state motor vehicle department gave municipalities a list of cars registered to addresses 
within their borders.
93
   Difficulties in evasion and collection remained however.  A 1915 report 
found that about 25% of vehicles registered that year hadn’t yet been entered onto any 
assessment lists.
94
  Residents must have known that the DMV would not send their car 
registrations to the city until the next year, and a portion of them saw no reason to pay for their 
first (and most expensive) year of car ownership.  Moreover, city assessors often found that car 
owners frequently claimed residency in low-tax towns rather than the higher-tax cities that they 
had originally given as their address for registration purposes.
95
  In 1920, the Hartford Courant 
reported that three-fifths of its auto taxes were uncollectable, and that many people were able to 
evade the tax by selling their cars, by buying at strategic times, or by moving to other towns.
96
  
Various officials, as well as some newspapers, called for the state to either collect the tax itself or 
exempt vehicles from taxation.
97
  In 1926, a panel of state assessors called it “the most 
troublesome tax now levied.”
98
   
2. The Vehicle Tax and State Highway Finance 
 
And yet, automobiles were so popular and roads took up so much of the state and local 
budget during the period that few were willing to get rid of the tax entirely.  In the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, road construction and maintenance was the state’s single largest expense, coming in 
above education and corrections, and accounting for 35 to 40 percent of Connecticut’s 
                                                            
92 Connecticut Motor Vehicle Register, Official Publication (1915). 
93 See Automobile Tax Results in Mix-up, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 1, 1922 at 19.   
94 Fairchild, supra note 91 at 18, citing a 1915 state commission on taxation report.  
95 See, e.g., Automobile Tax Results in Mix-up, supra note 93.     
96 City Losing on Automobile Tax, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 18, 1920 at 11.   
97 See, e.g., Biennial Report of the Tax Commissioner 1921 and 1922, supra note 73, 37-38;  Wants Auto Taxes 
Collected by the State, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 14, 1920 at 13. 






  About 17% of municipal revenue was also devoted to road work.
100
  Moreover, 
motorists were desperate enough for more and better roads that they were willing to pay special 
taxes earmarked for road construction and upkeep.
101
  Gasoline taxes and increased motor 
vehicle registration fees became a fast-growing source of state revenue.
 102
 States began to issue 
highway bonds.
103
  Many also considered levying an annual fee on vehicles in lieu of a property 
tax.  This move had the advantage of simplifying tax administration, since states were already in 
charge of vehicle registration.  It also erased the difference in tax burdens across localities, at the 
same time erasing the incentive to register one’s car in a different city or town.  By 1930, seven 
states had decided to levy state-wide vehicle fees in lieu of local taxes.
104
  These new fees 
essentially took motor vehicles out of the general property tax and earmarked all vehicle taxes 
for use in highway construction.  The argument was that highways should be paid for primarily 
by vehicle owners, since good highways were used for cars and little else.
105
 Local roads, on the 
other hand, could more properly be paid out of local property taxes, since they benefited local 
                                                            
99 Report of the Connecticut Temporary Commission to Study the Tax Laws of the State and to Make 
Recommendations Concerning Their Revision, Nov. 9, 1934, at 39, 50. Municipalities were also liable for damages 
because of defective bridges or roads, and could be ordered to do road work.  Id. at 131.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1420-
1424 (1934). 
100 Id. at 50. 
101 See, e.g., Introduction to the Report of the Connecticut Temporary Commission to Study the Tax Laws of the 
State and to Make Recommendations Concerning Their Revision, Nov. 9, 1934, at 71-76; Letters from the People, 
The Automobile Tax, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 10, 1915 at 8.    
102 Id. at  8 (stating that motor vehicle registration fees tripled between 1918 and 1927); see also Report of the 
Connecticut Temporary Commission, supra note 101, at 485-491.   
103 These bonds were issued in part to that states could receive federal matching funds for the amount that they spend 
on highways The first matching funds were given under the 1916 Federal Aid Road Act, which apportioned money 
based in part on the amount of road miles in a state.  See John Chynoweth Burnham, The Gasoline Tax and the 
Automobile Revolution, 48 MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HIST. REV. 435 (1961).  They were followed in 1921 by the Federal 
Highway Act.  See U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway History, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/blazer01.cfm.  
104 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 78 at 26, 107-116.  Idaho, Iowa, New York, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Vermont and North Dakota levied license fees in lieu of taxes.  Of those seven states, only Iowa still has a 
fee in lieu of tax.  It is state collected, with the state keeping the revenue.   






  In essence, administrators wanted to use vehicle taxes as benefit taxes – 
harkening back to the colonial theory of taxation and early New Haven’s use of special 
assessments when building fences and bridges.
107
  The same logic is still used today in some 
states’ vehicle tax collection statutes, presumably for the same reason: officials believed if they 
tied vehicle taxes to road construction and upkeep, motorists would be more willing to pay.
108
   
3. The Vehicle Tax after the Great Depression 
 
The Great Depression exposed problems with the real property tax that made the 
automobile tax look straightforward in comparison.  Real property was only infrequently 
reassessed, with the result that people were overpaying property taxes at the same time as they 
had lost significant portions of their wealth.
109
  The problem of variations in assessment also 
received increased public scrutiny.  According to one Connecticut tax report:   
[U]nderassessment is – or at least was prior to the depression – the rule rather than the 
exception, and it is a well-established fact that, where underassessment prevails, 
inequalities in assessment are likewise prevalent…. such real and personal property as is 
assessed is listed at widely varying proportions of true value.  Such conditions evidence 
                                                            
106 Connecticut Temporary Commission, supra note 101, Introduction at 71-72 (“Recognition has… been given to a 
division of all highways into two classes, designated by the United States Bureau of Public Roads as (1) general use 
highways and (2) land utilization highways.  General use highways have been laid out or are now primarily used for 
the benefit of the motorist as such, and such highways may properly be financed wholly out of special motor vehicle 
taxes.  Land utilization highways, including most of what are known as town roads and city streets, are used 
primarily as a means of access to the land, are of primary benefit to property owners, and may logically be finance 
out of property taxes and special assessments upon real estate.”)   
107 See infra note 267 and related text.    
108 For example, the proceeds from Arizona’s vehicle tax are apportioned among the Arizona Highway User 
Revenue Fund, The State Highway Fund, the general funds of Arizona’s counties, and the transportation funds of 
Arizona’s counties.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. §28-5808.  It was suggested in Connecticut as early as 1910 that tying car 
taxes to road expenditures would increase motorists’ willingness to pay. See Report of the Tax Commissioner for 
Biennial Period 1909 and 1910, supra note 85 at 19 (“Instead of [a local tax] it has also been suggested that the same 
be credited to the amount which the town would pay the State in connection with the construction of any highways 
within its borders. This plan would ensure that the money paid by automobile owners would be applied definitely to 
the roads.  If this were clearly understood, the tax might be paid with much more willingness, than if the amount 
received were used in defraying general town expenditures.”). 
109 Arthur O’Sullivan, Limits on Local Property Taxation: The United States Experience, in PROPERTY TAXATION 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 177, 179 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001) (“[T]he share of income absorbed by the 
property tax doubled between 1929 and 1932, reaching 11.3 percent in 1932.  During this three-year period, personal 








Road construction, on the other hand, was seen as a solution to urban decay and unemployment – 
roadwork would provide jobs and encourage people in the surrounding areas to go into the 
cities.
111
  Federal New Deal funding, combined with gas taxes and registration fees earmarked 
for roads, reduced the amount of Connecticut general fund revenue being spent on road 
maintenance and construction down to less than ten percent by 1948.
112
  Meanwhile, gas taxes 
were bringing in so much money that states began to divert the revenue they generated to non-
road uses such as education and state general funds – much to the chagrin of vehicle owners, 
who in 21 states successfully lobbied for “anti-diversion” amendments to their state 
constitutions.
113
  By 1956, the beginning of federal funding for the interstate highway system, 
nineteen states had done away with ad valorem vehicle taxes entirely and instead levied state-
wide registration fees.
114
  All but four of those states continue to levy no vehicle tax today, while 
only three states that levied a vehicle tax in 1956 have no tax now.
115
  It appears that the decades 
in which states and localities themselves shouldered most of the burden for road financing were 
the crucial ones in deciding whether or not they would rely upon an ad valorem vehicle tax.   
                                                            
110 Report of the Connecticut Temporary Commission, supra note 100, Introduction at 39.  
111 MARK H. ROSE, INTERSTATE: EXPRESS HIGHWAY POLITICS, 1939-1989, 10-12 (1990).  
112 Report of the Connecticut State Tax Survey Committee, 39 (1948). Federal road funding, and road construction 
itself, was limited during World War II, but picked back up again under the 1944 Federal Aid Highway Act. See 
ROSE, supra note 111 at 26. 
113 These amendments, requiring that gas taxes and registration fees be used to pay for roads, succeeded in 21 states.    
Id.at 32.    
114 See Appendix B.  
115 See Appendix B. In addition, all but one of the states that levied a uniform state-wide tax in 1956 continues to 
levy a uniform rate today.  The exception is Washington state, which abolished its vehicle tax in favor of a flat $30 
fee in 1999.  Erik D. Craft & Robert M. Schmidt, An Analysis of the Effects of Vehicle Property Taxes on Vehicle 




In Connecticut, the General Assembly slowly removed personal property from the tax 
rolls.
116
  Motor vehicles, however, despite presenting “formidable problems of assessment and 
even greater problems of tax collection,” were deemed “too important a source of revenue to be 
summarily freed from property taxation.”
117
  Despite occasional calls to join the other states that 
had opted for a state-wide tax rate,
118
 the vehicle tax in Connecticut remains as a local tax, as 
well as the last vestige of the personal property tax levied on Connecticut’s residents.     
Part II: The Modern Personal Property Tax 
 A. New Haven’s Vehicle Tax 
 
The current vehicle tax is free of many of the disadvantages that haunted its predecessors.  
The state Department of Motor Vehicles still maintains a registry with addresses of all 
Connecticut vehicle owners, giving the New Haven’s Assessor’s Office a list of all cars 
registered in the city as of October first.
119
  Now, however, it also prepares a supplemental list in 
November of those vehicles registered to New Haven addresses since October first.  Taxes are 
prorated for the first year the vehicle is owned, with the result that residents can no longer time 
their car purchases to avoid a year of taxes.
120
  The problem of differing valuations across cities 
has also been solved.  All Connecticut municipalities now use the annual National Automobile 
Dealer’s Association (NADA) guide to new and used car prices to set each car on the grand list 
                                                            
116 The law still states that all property is taxable, but §12-81 of the General Statutes chronicles the slow death of the 
personal property tax through a list of 77 exemptions including cattle, household furniture, all livestock except 
horses and ponies above a certain value, carriages, wagons, and bicycles, boats, and aircraft.   
117 Id. Introduction at 40. 
118Id. Introduction at 40. Wants Auto Taxes Collected by the State, supra note 97. 
119 Residents are normally taxed where they reside, CONN. GEN. STAT. §12-71(f).  Non-residents are taxed where 
their car is garaged.  Id.  
120 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-71 (2010).  Most towns prorate by the month, as the DMV does not give them the exact 
date that a vehicle is registered.  See John Rappa, OLR Research Report: Supplemental Motor Vehicle Property Tax, 




at seventy percent of its fair market value.
121
  Tax bills must be paid before vehicle registrations 
can be renewed.
122
  This registration restriction, combined with aggressive collection by the Tax 
Collector’s office and the private contractors that it hires, has for the past few years allowed New 
Haven to collect over ninety percent of vehicle taxes due.
123
   
1. The Tax Rate and the Budget Process 
The grand list system continues to work much the same as it has since colonial times, 
though there is no longer a state-wide tax on the town grand list.  New Haven’s tax rate is now 
determined annually and based upon projected revenues and expenditures.  Each fiscal year, the 
mayor compiles a budget, estimates all non-tax sources of revenue, and uses the previous year’s 
grand list to set a mill rate that will bring total revenues in line with budgeted expenditures.  The 
mayor then tenders the budget to the Board of Aldermen, who holds public hearings and then 
workshops with its finance committee.  The Board of Aldermen has the power to modify the 
budget and increase or decrease the tax rate accordingly.
124
   
Statewide, local governments collect over $557 million in vehicle taxes each year, or 
about ten percent of total local revenue.
125
  Vehicle assessments make up about six percent of 
New Haven’s grand list.
126
  However, since the city receives significant state funding, taxes on 
                                                            
121 The Office of Policy and Management put in place state-wide use of the NADA guide, in accordance with CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 12-71d (2010), which requires the OPM to choose a schedule for motor vehicle values.  After 
valuation, all motor vehicles – as well as all real property and business personal property - are put on the grand list at 
seventy percent of their value.   CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-62a(b) (2010).      
122 In fact, if a taxpayer hasn’t paid taxes on one of the vehicles registered his name, then he cannot renew 
registrations on any of his other vehicles either.  See infra note 188. 
123 CITY OF NEW HAVEN, ADOPTED FISCAL YEAR 2009-2010 BUDGET § 1-32. See infra, Part II, Section C.  
124 According to the New Haven Charter, the Aldermen can decrease the tax rate with a simple majority vote, but 
need a two thirds majority to increase the rate. NEW HAVEN CITY CHARTER, Art. XI, § 58.   
125 See Blue Ribbon Commission supra note 7, at 30 (2003); see also Report on Bills Favorably Reported by 
Committee, Bill No. HB-5661, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/jfr/h/2004HB-05661-R00FIN-JFR.htm.   
126 CITY OF NEW HAVEN, ADOPTED FISCAL YEAR 2010-2011 BUDGET § 2-61, [hereinafter BUDGET FY 2010-2011], 




its grand list supply a smaller portion of its budget than that of most other Connecticut cities.  
 
Real Property Taxes  $187,203,562  
Motor Vehicle Taxes $12,759,464  
Personal Property Taxes $16,247,784  
State Aid for Education $153,136,528  
Other State Aid $48,649,904  
Other Revenue $53,585,853  
Total General Fund Revenue 471,583,095 
Capital Fund Revenue (City 
Bonds) 28,571,527 
Special Funds 148,431,143 




The “Other Revenue” category in the general fund is made up mostly of city-collected 
licenses, permits, fees and fines.
127
  “Other State Aid” comes mostly from the state PILOT 
program, which reimburses municipalities for a portion of the real property tax that they would 
have received had the educational institutions and hospitals within their borders not been tax-
exempt.
128
  State law contains vehicle tax exemptions for certain non-profits as well as for 
                                                            
127 Id. § 2-22. 
128 See State of Connecticut, Office of Policy and Management, Colleges (Private) and General Free Standing 
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veterans, active duty servicemen, and certain vehicles used on farms.
 129
  In addition, New 
Haven’s status as a “distressed municipality” allows it to exempt commercial vehicles used by 
companies engaged in recycling, biotechnology, or manufacturing.
130
  However, only about two 
percent of New Haven’s motor vehicles receive tax exempt status.
131
    
2. Tax Collection  
The New Haven Charter drives the city to aggressively collect vehicle taxes.  According 
to the Charter, the mayor must account for uncollected taxes when he sets the tax rate.  He must 
assume that one percent fewer taxes will be paid in the current budget year than were paid in the 
previous year, and he cannot present an unbalanced budget to the Board of Aldermen.
132
  It thus 
behooves the mayor to ensure that the tax collection rate is high: all other things being equal, an 
increase in uncollected taxes would force him to either cut the budget or raise the mill rate.   
New Haven’s current Mayor, John DeStefano Jr., has taken the one percent rule to heart.  
When he assumed office in 1994, motor vehicle tax collection rates were around 85 percent, real 
property collection rates were at 92 percent, and New Haven had one of the highest mill rates in 
Connecticut.  For fiscal year 2006-2007, the last year for which the City Budget lists motor 
vehicle collection rates separately, the vehicle collection rate was 92.83 percent and the real 
property collection rate was 99.26 percent.
133
  New Haven still had one of the highest mill rates 
in Connecticut, but, Mayor DeStefano is quick to point out, it may have been even higher if the 
                                                            
129 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81 (2010).  In addition, active duty servicemen are exempt under federal law from 
paying property taxes in a state in which they do not reside. 50 U.S.C. app. § 571(d)(1) (2006). 
130 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-94b (2010).  Note that this provision is set to sunset in 2013.  Companies themselves 
must apply for these exemptions, which are subject to review by the State.    
131 BUDGET FY 2010-2011 § 2-16.  
132 NEW HAVEN CITY CHARTER, Art. XI, § 58.  








3. Appeals and Abatements 
 
Taxpayers can file vehicle tax appeals with the tax assessor and then with the Board of 
Assessment Appeals.  This board has its roots in the colonial Board of Relief, a three-person 
administrative body that heard complaints about inaccurate listing of property.
136
  It still has 
three members, now appointed by the Mayor, and performs essentially the same function.  After 
going before the Board, or before if the taxpayer believes that the city laid a tax that was 
“manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions 
of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property”, taxpayers can file suit in Superior 
Court.
137
  Very few people avail themselves of this process, however.  Despite the fact that New 
Haven does not take mileage or needed repairs into account in valuing vehicles, only forty 
                                                            
134 Jeff Holtz, Tax Collector Hits the Road in New Haven, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E05E6D81F30F93AA2575AC0A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&&sc
p=1&sq=bootfinder&st=cse. 
135 Data is compiled from different charts and tables in the budget books of New Haven for FY 2008-2009, FY 
2009-2010, and FY 2010-2011.   
136 See JONES, supra note 11, at 34; Potter, supra note 15, at 174.    
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people and one corporation appealed their motor vehicle taxes to the Board last year.
138
  Only 
twenty-one attended the mandatory appeals meeting; fifteen appeals were granted.
139
  
There is some debate as to whether vehicle taxes can be abated or forgiven.  New 
Haven’s Aldermanic Tax Abatement Committee has abated vehicle taxes in the past, but in 
doing so it apparently acted against its own bylaws, which specify that it will only abate real 
property taxes.
140
 In any event, relatively few taxpayers ask for vehicle tax abatements.  
According to the Tax Abatement Committee’s minutes, only nine requests have been made in the 
past two years, despite the fact that a majority of those requests have been granted.
141
     
4. Public Reaction to the Vehicle Tax 
 
 The above description makes the vehicle tax sound like an orderly but insignificant part 
of New Haven’s current tax system.  Newspaper articles, statements from the tax assessor, and 
press releases from Mayor DeStefano’s office tell a different story.  William O’Brien, New 
Haven’s current assessor, echoes the assessors of the 1920s and 30s, saying that vehicles taxes 
are by far the most contentious tax the city levies
142
 – quite a feat given the current economic  
                                                            
138 Meeting Minutes, New Haven Board of Assessment Appeals, Oct. 19, 2010, available at 
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/Assessor/pdfs/Written%20minutes%2010-19-101.pdf; Meeting Minutes, New 
Haven Board of Assessment Appeals, Sept. 30, 2010, available at 
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/Assessor/pdfs/BTR%20minutes%209.30.10.pdf. 
139 Id. Note that the one corporation who filed an appeal, First Student Corporation, was a school bus company with 
139 separate vehicles on appeal.  All of those appeals were denied.   
140 Board of Alderman President Carl Goldfield discovered that the Abatement Committee had been acting contrary 
to its by-laws after the Committee came under scrutiny as a result of its investigation of the Board of Assessment 
Appeals.  See Melissa Bailey, Goldfield Calls for Review of Tax Panel, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, Sept. 21, 2010, 
available at http://newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/tax_panel_powers_to_be_reexamined/.   
141 City of New Haven, Tax Abatement Committee, Meeting Minutes, Sept. 14, 2010; City of New Haven, Tax 
Abatement Committee, Meeting Minutes, July 26, 2010; City of New Haven, Tax Abatement Committee, Meeting 
Minutes, June 21, 2010; City of New Haven, Tax Abatement Committee, Meeting Minutes, April 14, 2010; City of 
New Haven, Tax Abatement Committee, Meeting Minutes, Nov. 12, 2009; City of New Haven, Tax Abatement 
Committee, Meeting Minutes, May 6, 2009.  All meeting minutes are available at  
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/aldermen/LegistarCalendar.asp.     




climate and the current controversy generated by other New Haven local taxes.
143
   
B. The Vehicle Tax and Tax Morale  
 1. Local Government and Tax Morale 
The scholarly literature on tax compliance begins with the Allingham and Sandmo model, 
which takes the economics of crime model made popular by Gary Becker and applies it to tax 
evasion, arguing that evasion will vary inversely with the probability of detection and the degree 
of punishment.
144
  However, this model predicts far lower compliance than is actually found in 
the target of most scholars’ attention: the federal income tax.  As a result, social scientists and 
others began to study tax morale, defined as whatever attitudes, moral codes, and virtues of the 
tax system lead to more compliance than can be explained by rational deterrence.
145
  Social 
scientists and economists have found that factors such as democratic processes, perception of  
                                                            
143 The Board of Assessment Appeals was devoid of members for a period last year after resident complaints led to a 
round of subpoenas and eventual allegations of nepotism, inadequate records keeping, and gross incompetence. 
Betsy Yagla, No Accountability, NEW HAVEN ADVOCATE, June 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.newhavenadvocate.com/featured-news/no-accountability.  Cameras with audio have recently been 
installed in the assessor’s and collector’s office after complaints that staff had been dismissive and disrespectful. 
Pamela McLoughlin, New Haven Makes Changes in Tax Assessor’s Office, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, July 26, 2010, 
available at http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2010/07/26/news/new_haven/doc4c4df57633672822383225.txt. 
Assessor O’Brien valued business personal property at a flat $5000 last year for a number of small businesses who 
for years had reported the same small amount of business personal property on their tax bill.  He also sent bills to 
several organizations who had previously been given tax exempt status. Abbe Smith, Nonprofits Score on the 
Rebound, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Aug. 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2010/08/10/aa1monnenonprofits081010.txt. As a result, a great many small 
business owners and their aldermen are calling for his removal and around 50 lawsuits have been filed in Superior 
Court. Allan Appel, Tax Assessor Grilled, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, June 22, 2010, available at 
http://newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/tax_assessor_taxed_and_/. Adding to his woes is a 
clerical error that led to higher tax bills for hundreds of low-income seniors participating in the state’s real property 
tax freeze program. Melissa Bailey, Tax Office Glitch Startles Seniors, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, July 2, 2010, 
available at http://newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/tax_office_glitch_startles_seniors/ 
144 Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income tax evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 323 (1972).   
145 See, e.g., BENNO TORGLER, TAX COMPLIANCE AND TAX MORALE: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 4-
5 (2007); Bruno S. Frey & Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis (CESIFO, 




fairness, and belief that neighbors are also paying all increase tax morale.
146
     
However, tax morale is by definition measured using increases or decreases in 
compliance rates.  Such a measurement would be difficult to apply to New Haven’s local taxes.  
Real property is almost impossible to keep off the grand list.  The assessor’s office has the 
resources to keep track of all uncollected taxes, and property would have to be subject to an 
underwater mortgage or worth far less than its assessed value in order for a tax sale to be in the 
best interest of the property’s owner.  Vehicles are slightly easier to keep off the grand list, but in 
order to do so, most New Havenites would have to fail to register their cars or register them in 
another state.
147
  The interest rate on past-due taxes is eighteen percent, and special tow or boot 
fees apply as well.
148
  In short, the consequences of non-payment are dire enough, and the 
chances of being caught high enough, that high collection rates and low morale can easily co-
exist.   
Instead, the literature on local government taxation focuses on benefits/tax ratios, tying 
back to the idea – espoused by motorists in the 1930s and 40s and by scholars of Colonial 
taxation – that local taxes should furnish residents with local services.
149
  The willingness of an 
individual to pay for public goods forms the numerator of the benefits/tax ratio while the 
individual’s tax burden is the denominator.
150
  Normally, when social scientists focus on the 
numerator in the benefits/tax ratio, they focus on an individual’s preference for a certain package 
                                                            
146 For an overview and introduction to these studies, see TORGLER, supra note 145, at 64-105. 
147 The Tax assessor’s office contracts with a private agency to sweep the city looking for out of state plates.  Once 
they find one, they run a credit check and check the registered voting roles to see if a car is owned by a New Haven 
resident.  Interview with Roger Palmer, Assistant Assessor, City of New Haven (Feb. 28, 2011).   
148 See discussion infra, Part II, Section 2B(II). 
149 See, e.g., GLENN BEAMER, CREATIVE POLITICS: TAXES AND PUBLIC GOODS IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 11-28 (1999) 
(discussing benefits/tax ratios).  See supra note 19 and related text for a discussion of benefits taxation in the 
highway funding context.  See supra note 113 and related text for scholars’ views on colonial taxation and the 
benefits tax theory.   




of goods and services, or on whether taxpayers believe that an extra unit of government benefit is 
worth the extra tax cost.
151
  However, since tax morale also affects resident’s willingness to pay 
tax, it too is a component in the benefit/tax numerator.  It is thus possible for an individual’s 
benefits/tax ratio to change even though she pays the same total dollar amount in taxes and 
receives the same services as she did before.  For example, if she likes paying the real property 
tax more than she likes paying the vehicle tax, then her willingness to pay will be increased if the 
vehicle tax is abolished.  Put another way, tax morale is a public good.
152
  This is hardly a new 
insight or a new phenomenon.  Adam Smith put it in slightly different terms in The Wealth of 
Nations: 
A tax may take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it 
brings into the public treasury…. it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, 
vexation, and oppression; and though vexation is not, strictly speaking, expense, it is 
certainly equivalent to the expense at which every man would be willing to redeem 
himself from it.
153
    
The insight has direct consequences for modern New Haven.  Since the city has control over the 
assessment, tax rates and enforcement of real property and motor vehicle taxes, tax morale 
surrounding those laws will be almost entirely a local public good.  And, although tax collection 
rates are unlikely to significantly decrease – or perhaps in part because they are unlikely to 
significantly decrease and the taxpayer cannot silently protest by failing to pay
154
 – tax laws have 
power to shape resident’s willingness to support local programs, and thus their attitudes towards  
                                                            
151 Id. at 12-13; William A. Fischel, Municipal Corporations, Homeowners, and the Benefit View of the Property 
Tax, PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 33, 33 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001).  
152 See, e.g., Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273 (suggesting that laws be 
evaluated as local public goods instead of by evaluating their effects upon behavior).   
153 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 372 (J. R. McCulloch 
ed., 1863).   
154 TORGLER, supra note 145, at 26, citing Skimrod, Frey.  “Increased enforcement of the tax system might produce 






     
Moreover, since tax laws affect both the numerator and the denominator of the 
benefits/tax ratio, they are likely to have a greater effect on residents’ satisfaction with local 
government than other laws do.  Since residents see taxes as the price they pay for government 
services, resentment towards a tax has the potential to color residents’ views on every service 
local government provides them.  As such, the deck is already stacked against government.  Even 
in a world where residents received benefits exactly equal to their tax burden, loss aversion 
would still make them unlikely to think that their taxes were worth it.  When some taxes are 
more despised than others, however, the picture has the potential to become even bleaker.  Under 
taxpayers’ mental accounting, it is possible that every service they are provided can be seen as 
being paid for by the tax that they like the least.
156
  Therefore, even a small tax can have outsized 
effects on a benefits/tax ratio, and thus on a taxpayer’s attitudes towards local government.   
Of course, aggregate levels of benefits/tax ratios are almost impossible to tease out.
157
  
Loss aversion and the possibility of freeriding give residents an incentive to understate their 
willingness to pay.
158
  And, even if you could discover individual’s ratios, different voting blocs 
                                                            
155 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001); Wallace E. Oates, Property Taxation and 
Local Government Finance: An Overview and Some Reflections, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
FINANCE (ed. Wallace E. Oates, 2001).  
156 See Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCIENCE 199 (1985); Richard H. 
Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183 (1999).  Under mental accounting theory, 
consumers assign expenditures to certain benefits accounts.  For example, a resident pays $100 in vehicle taxes, 
$300 in real property taxes, and receives $500 in local services.  If she dislikes the vehicle tax more than the real 
property tax, then whenever she thinks of a particular government benefit, she may be more likely to assign that 
benefit to her vehicle tax payment, decreasing her willingness to pay for it.  The fact that her aggregate benefit level 
is above her aggregate tax level may not matter.   
157 BEAMER, supra note 149, at 11-12.  
158 Id. at 11.  Some attempt has been made to solve this problem through use of the “Lindahl tax.” In Lindahl 
equilibrium, each resident reveals the price he is willing to pay for a particular public good, and a demand curve is 
created using all resident’s prices.  The idea is attributed to Erik Lindahl.  Erik Lindahl, Just Taxation - A Positive 
Solution (1919), reprinted in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. 




or interest groups in local politics would no doubt have different ratios.
159
  Likewise, different 
residents will have different views on equity, fairness in administration, and other factors that 
affect tax morale.
160
  Nevertheless, many of the factors that social scientists have identified as 
decreasing tax morale are present in the vehicle tax, and may help to explain what New Haven 
and other municipalities can do to make the tax more palatable.   
2. Comparison with the Real Property Tax 
 
New Havenites’ benefits/tax ratio will include their attitudes towards both the vehicle tax 
and the real property tax.  It would be difficult to consider the two separately, however: residents’ 
perception of the vehicle tax will be based not only upon its own merits and drawbacks, but also 
upon whether residents believe it to be a better or worse tax than the real property tax.   
I. Intrinsic Morale-Lowering Factors  
 
Vehicles depreciate quickly, and often have a useful life of a decade or less.
161
  This may 
decrease tax morale, as residents can easily imagine the money they pay in vehicle taxes as 
coming directly out of the savings that they plan to use to buy a new car.  Those inclined to think 
in terms of present value can calculate out how much their taxes add to the expense of car 
ownership.   Real estate, on the other hand, tends to appreciate.  This causes its own difficulties, 
especially for those on a fixed income, but Connecticut has put in place circuit breaker programs 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
just taxation, see Barbara H. Fried, Symposium: Federal Tax Policy in the New Millenium: The Puzzling Case for 
Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 157, 168-79 (1999).   
159 Id., citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).  
160 See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 1057-58 
(1987). 
161 Only 37% of the vehicles in the U.S. are ten years old or older.  Changes in the U.S. Household Vehicle Fleet: 
National Highway Travel Survey Brief (National Highway Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, Sept. 




to help those most likely to be in that situation.
162
  In addition, vehicles are re-assessed each year 
based on their NADA value.
163
  Real property assessments happen less often, with the result that 
real property is often underassessed and undertaxed.  Also, property taxes are to some extent 
already capitalized into the price residents paid for homes.  Higher tax rates lead to lower home 
prices, and only unexpected changes in the property tax rate will put property owners at an 
economic disadvantage.
164
   
   Equity concerns may also help to explain resident’s reaction to the vehicle tax.  Tax 
morale is higher when people believe that they are paying a reasonable amount in relation to 
their peers.
165
  And yet, as a tax on the consumption of cars, the vehicle tax is likely 
regressive.
166
  No one knows exactly how regressive, however.  Any calculations would also 
                                                            
162 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-170aa-cc.  The state also has in place a tax freeze program for seniors, but it was closed 
to new applicants in 1979.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-129b.  In addition, the state allows municipalities to freeze 
property taxes for certain low-income seniors.  CONN. GEN. STAT. §12-170v-w; CONN. GEN. STAT. §12-129n. In 
New Haven, seniors with an income of less than $50,000 per year and who have lived in New Haven for over ten 
years can apply to have their property taxes frozen. Melissa Bailey, Tax Office Glitch Startles Seniors, NEW HAVEN 
INDEPENDENT, July 2, 2010, available at 
http://newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/tax_office_glitch_startles_seniors/. 
163 Although taxes generally decrease as cars age, the grand list for the previous fiscal year is used to levy taxes in 
the current year, with the result that residents routinely pay more tax than the current state of their vehicle warrants.  
Since vehicle assessments are based on NADA value, assessors cannot skew assessments low to appease taxpayers.  
In fact, since the market for new cars cooled this past year, the NADA increased the value of some used cars, 
leading to higher taxes this year than last for a number of unhappy residents.   See Thomas MacMillan, City Wants 
More for Vanessa’s Chevy, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, June 29, 2010, available at 
http://newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/city_wants_more_for_vanessas_chevy/ 
164 See, e.g., JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 95 (6th ed. 1997). Of course, the effect of this phenomenon on tax morale will depend upon whether or 
not residents view their property taxes as capitalized into the value of their homes.  
165 See Michael W. Spicer & Lee A. Becker, Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach, 33 
NAT’L TAX J., 171   But see TORGLER, supra note 145, at 95 (summarizing other studies that found lesser or 
statistically insignificant effects).   
166 Only three studies of vehicle tax regressivity appear to exist.  All three have found that the tax is at least mildly 
regressive.  Craft & Schmidt, supra note 115 (using data from Virginia to estimate vehicle tax incidence); Jennifer 
Dill et. al., California Vehicle License Fees: Incidence and Equity, 2 J. OF TRANSP. STAT. 2, 133 (2002), available at 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/journal_of_transportation_and_statistics/volume_02_number_02/ jts_v2_n2.pdf; 
Rebecca A. Bremer, Assessing the Incidence of the Personal Property Tax on Vehicles, University of  
Richmond Honors Thesis (2001)(cited in Craft & Schmidt, supra note 115, as analyzing regressivity using data from 
904 families in Connecticut, California, and Rhode Island).  Governor Rell’s office claimed that the tax is also 
regressive in Connecticut, although she was trying to eliminate the tax at the time.  M. Jodi Rell, Governor of 





have to take into account Connecticut’s property tax credit, which applies both to real property 
and vehicle taxes, and which erases the vehicle tax burden for some low-income taxpayers.
167
  
And, even if the vehicle tax’s relative burden were clear, scholars have debated for decades 
about whether or not the real property tax is regressive, making comparisons between the two 
taxes difficult to make.
168
  Furthermore, even if the vehicle tax were more regressive than the 
property tax, the fact that vehicle taxes can be avoided by using public transportation or 
carpooling may affect the way people think about the burden it places on residents.   
However, regardless of its true incidence, the vehicle tax is considerably more salient 
than the property tax for the portion of New Haven’s population that rents.
169
  Although a 
percentage of their rent is shifted property tax, renters – and economists for that matter – are 
unable to calculate the exact amount.
170
  Such “hidden” taxes naturally lead to less concentrated 
political opposition, since it is more difficult to be incensed about a tax when you don’t know 
how much of it you pay.
 171
   As a result, renters tend to be apathetic about the real property tax, 
while homeowners monitor it closely.
172
  The vehicle tax, on the other hand, is paid directly to 
the city every year, by renters and homeowners alike.  (In fact, the vehicle tax may be more 
                                                            
167 For an overview of the current property tax credit, see Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Fiscal Analysis, 
Connecticut Tax Expenditure Report 21 (Mar. 2010) available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/29102050/Tax-
Expenditure-Report-March-2010. 
168 For a summary of the debate on whether or not the property tax is regressive, see HELLERSTEIN, supra note 164, 
at 93-95.  The debate boils down to the question of who bears the burden of the tax: property owners/user or those 
supplying capital for building.   
169 See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, Property Taxation and Local Government Spending: The Renter Effect, 57 J. URB. 
ECON. 419, 2005 (“[T]here is some indirect, but pervasive, evidence suggesting that renters don’t think that they pay 
local property taxes. This has led to the claim that there is a “renter illusion” associated with the tax.”).  Oates goes 
on to postulate that there is a “renter effect” of about ten percent in local budgets.  That is, local governments 
overspend by ten percent because of renters.   See also infra note 292 and related text.   
170 For an overview of real property salience and its effects on renters, see Wallace 
E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RUSSELL MATHEWS 65 (1988).  For a discussion of property tax shifting as between renters 
and landlords see George R. Zodrow, Reflections on the New View and the Benefit View of the Property Tax, in 
PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, 100-01 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001). 
171 See, e.g., Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145 (2009).  




salient than the real property tax even for some homeowners, as those who escrow their property 
taxes may not realize how much they pay.
173
)  While many residents get their vehicle taxes back 
in the form of a state property tax credit, the initial pain of paying the tax is nevertheless present.  
In New Haven, where approximately thirty-six percent of residents rent, this salience is likely to 
have a profound effect on tax satisfaction.
174
   
II. Local Factors Affecting Vehicle Tax Morale 
 
The above downsides to the vehicle tax exist wherever the tax is levied, though they may 
operate with more force where vehicle tax rates are higher.  New Havenites, however, have 
additional reasons to dislike the tax.  First, they pay an unusually high amount of it, both 
compared to those living in other states,
 175
 and compared to other Connecticut cities.
176
   While 
New Haven’s 2010 mill rate was set at 43.9, Hamden’s is set at 31.16 and Orange’s at 28.30.
177
  
Hartford has the state’s highest rate at 72.79 and Greenwich its lowest at 8.596.
178
  As a result, 
one of the things that makes cars a good object for a property tax – their easily ascertainable 
value – also makes it quite clear that different cities have unequal car tax burdens.  Car insurance, 
also particularly high in New Haven as compared to its surrounding suburbs, further adds to the  
                                                            
173 See  M. Jodi Rell, Governor of Connecticut, Testimony of Governor M. Jodi Rell at a Public Hearing Before the 
Finance, Revenue and Bonding Committee, Feb. 27, 2006, available at 
http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/cwp/view.asp?a=1809&q=311002 (“As opposed to residential property taxes, the 
car tax is not paid through a bank or a mortgage company.  It comes right out of our personal savings or checking 
accounts without the luxury of being buried in an escrow payment or a mortgage charge.”). 
174 U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Vacancy and Homeownership Rates by State and MSA, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/rates/index.html.  The New Haven-Milford Metropolitan Statistical 
Area had a homeownership rate of 64.1 in the fourth quarter of 2010.   
175 Eighteen states do not levy vehicle taxes at all. See Appendix B.  Even in those states that do, New Haven has an 
especially high rate.  Scott Mackey & Mandy Rafool, supra note 6.       
176 Intergovernmental Policy Division, Office of Policy and Management, Mill Rates, available at 
http://www.ct.gov/opm/cwp/view.asp?a=2987&q=385976. 
177 Id. 




cost of car ownership.
179
   
Moreover, while real property taxes are capitalized into the price of property, vehicle 
taxes are not.  And, as State Senator Michael Looney notes, “While you might be able to argue 
that the value of homes might vary greatly depending upon location, it seems clear that a car is a 
car wherever it is.”
180
 Other politicians prefer to use more populist language.  As Governor Rell 
noted in her 2006 State of the State address,  
A taxpayer in Greenwich pays $273 in property taxes for a 2005 Four Door Mercedes-
Benz Sedan. A taxpayer in Waterbury taxpayer pays $278 in property taxes for a 2000 2-
Door Convertible Chevrolet Cavalier. Does it make sense for a Greenwich taxpayer to 
pay $5 less in property taxes per year for a new Mercedes than a Waterbury taxpayer 
pays for a 6-year old Chevy?
181
   
Much of the dissatisfaction with the vehicle tax can surely be attributed to the fact that vehicle 
tax, in addition to being highly salient, is easy to compare across states and municipalities.        
Moreover, New Haven is extremely aggressive in its efforts to collect the vehicle tax.  It 
was the second local government in the nation to use the “bootfinder,” a hand-held license plate 
scanner that is linked to a database of vehicles with parking tickets and outstanding taxes.
182
  Use 
of the bootfinder was novel enough to warrant an article in the New York Times, which 
interviewed Mayor DeStefano.
 183
  He told reporters that the vehicle tax collection rate lagged 
behind the city’s real property tax collection rate, and said that he hoped the new device would 
                                                            
179 Interview with Roger Palmer, supra note 147. 
180 George Judson, New Haven Mayor Pushes Property-Tax Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1994, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E02EED8103EF937A35752C0A962958260&pagewanted=all 
181 Governor M. Jodi Rell, 2006 State of the State Address, available at 
http://www.hartfordinfo.org/issues/wsd/taxes/governor_address_Feb06.asp; see also M. Jodi Rell, supra note 166 
(“Consider this:  If you own a 2003 Ford Taurus Wagon 4D SE and you live in Bridgeport, you pay $309 in car 
taxes.  If you live in New Canaan and drive the same car, you pay $103 – one-third the cost of your neighbor 
in Bridgeport!”). 
182 The first was Arlington County, Virginia, home to a campaign to abolish the vehicle tax that once popularized 
“ax the tax” bumper stickers.  Mike Allen, Car Tax Issue Drives Gilmore’s Campaign While Breyer’s Stalls, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 2, 1997.   




increase the vehicle tax collection rate to similar levels.
184
  It partially succeeded: in New Haven, 
and in the municipalities that followed it in using the bootfinder, simply announcing the new 
program brought in tens of thousands of dollars in past-due taxes.
185
  But complaints – about the 
device itself and about the vehicle tax in general – began to mount.      
Aggressive collection is made possible by several practices that decrease tax morale by 
flying in the face of residents’ ideas about how the government should interact with them as 
taxpayers, and as a result further decrease tax morale.
186
  The Assessor’s office requires residents 
to prove that they have disposed of a vehicle by turning in its plates and either showing proof of 
sale or a receipt from a junkyard, leading residents to complain that the Assessors office is 
treating them as presumptively guilty of tax evasion.
187
  Delinquent taxpayers also decry the use 
of “jeopardy collection,” whereby they must pay not only their past-due taxes, but also their 
current ones before their car is released from impound.
188
   
Even those not inclined to be sympathetic to the plight of tax cheats can find fault with 
the current collection system.  High interest rates and lack of notice can result in residents 
                                                            
184 Id.  
185 Id.; Jeff Holtz, City’s Hunt for Tax Cheats Hits Resistance, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,2006, available at 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40615FB385A0C748EDDA10894DE404482&scp=4&sq=bootfind
er&st=cse (discussing Bridgeport’s use of the bootfinder); Amanda Pinto, West Haven Getting ‘Boot’ Again?, NEW 
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bb1_mon_whboot020711.txt (discussing controversy over West Haven’s Bootfinder pilot program).  The increase in 
tax collection rates can also be see in the graph accompanying note 135. 
186 See Frey, supra note 145. 
187 Having turned in the vehicle’s registration is not enough, the assessor’s office says, because in the past people 
have evaded taxes by turning in their registration only to re-register their cars directly afterward. Interview with 
Roger Palmer, supra note 147.   They point out that the Assessor’s Office policy of requiring a bill of sale or a 
junkyard receipt makes it very difficult for those who, for whatever reason, are assessed on vehicles not their own.  
Proving that you do not and have never owned a particular vehicle turns out to be a rather involved process.  
Thomas MacMillian, Is An Affidavit Enough?, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, Oct. 26, 2010, available at 
http://newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/is_an_affidavit_enough/.   
188 CONN. GEN. STAT. §12-163.  See also Erin Cox, Taxes Made Easy in New Haven, News8 wtnh.com, available at 
http://www.wtnh.com/dpp/news/new_haven_cty/news_wtnh_newhaven_taxes_made_easy_200906251836_rev1.  
Adding insult to injury for those behind on their taxes, the tax collector has declared that, although you may retrieve 
personal property from your car while it is in impound, you may not strip it of its stereo, radio, tires, and battery and 





receiving hefty bills on cars that they have not owned in years and never intended to hide from 
collectors.
189
  Even DMV registration has not fully overcome the colonial-era difficulties of 
taxing movable property: if a taxpayer fails to notify the DMV of a change in address, he may 
not receive a vehicle tax bill.
190
  Yet, lack of notice does not excuse a vehicle owner from paying 
taxes or penalties, and the state imposes an eighteen percent annual interest rate on all past-due 
property tax.
191
  This high rate is a source of consternation for those who owe back taxes.  Even 
the FDIC considers it excessive: in 1997, it challenged the rate in court after the tax sale of a 
property in which it had a mortgage interest, arguing that the rate was so high that a portion of it 
must constitute a fine or penalty.
192
  The statute of limitations for tax collection is fifteen years, 
allowing a considerable amount of interest to build up.
193
  A proposal to keep the fifteen year 
statute of limitations for all other taxes but decrease it to six years for motor vehicle taxes has 
been floated in the General Assembly several times, presumably because of the possibility of 
taxpayers owing large amounts of interest and not knowing until town collectors tracked them 
down years later.  However, the consensus at committee meetings has been that the vehicle tax 
requires harsh laws to encourage collection.
194
  
Moreover, towing or booting is a highly invasive means of tax collection – without 
access to their cars, people often find themselves without an easy way to get to work, pick up 
                                                            
189 Interview with Roger Palmer, supra note 147.    
190 Before 2010, the DMV did not automatically update addresses, even if residents changed their address with the 
U.S. Postal Service.  Now, thanks to an amendment to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-163, the Commissioner of Motor 
Vehicles may (though not must) use Postal Service change of address information to update vehicle owners’ 
addresses.   
191 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-146 (2010). 
192 Town of Monroe v. 837 Main Street Corporation, 712 A.2d  996 (1997).  12 U.S.C. Sec. 1825(b)(3) exempts the 
FDIC from paying fines or penalties.  The court, however, declared the eighteen percent interest rate non-punitive 
because it was set at a time when the prime rate was almost as high.      
193 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-174 (2010). 
194 PD Committee Hearing Transcript for 03/03/2008.  It is worth noting that other municipalities have not been 
nearly as successful as New Haven in enforcing tax rates.  Bridgeport, for example, had a 70% collection rate in 
2004, and in 2005 had over 100,000 tax warrants out on motor vehicles.  Jeff Holtz, City’s Hunt for Tax Cheats Hits 




their children, or get to the tax collector’s office to pay their taxes.  (Indeed, public pressure has 
caused the Tax Collector’s office to declare the parking spaces in front of City Hall a “safe zone” 
lest people have their cars towed while they are going in to pay their taxes).
195
  In addition, 
people may naturally hold the real property tax collection process up as a standard against which 
to judge motor vehicle tax collection.
196
  Tax liens may keep you from selling your home, but 
they at least allow you to continue using it.  Tax sales of real property, though an uncomfortable 
process, at least have the virtue of taking a long time.  Moreover, notice of a pending real 
property sale is more or less a constitutionally-protected right.
197
  In comparison, having a motor 
vehicle towed immediately deprives car owners of the use of their property, creating 
considerable resentment.  As Assistant Assessor Roger Palmer puts it, “A person’s house could 
burn down, and they’ll deal with it.  But if you town their car, they go nuts.  I’ve seen it happen 
here.  You can always crash at a friend’s house, but you can’t necessarily always get to work.”
198
 
New Haven also contracts with private companies both to sweep the city for unregistered 
or out-of-state vehicles and to tow cars with back taxes.  All levels of government have, at one 
time or another, contracted tax collection out either to private companies or to “tax farmers,” 
normally paying them based upon a percentage of the taxes they collected.
199
  However, modern 
taxpayers often express anxiety about giving private companies access to their personal 
information, even though it may be publically available at the assessor’s office.  They like it even 
less when towers come on to private property to collect cars.  Many are also concerned about 
towers targeting lower-income neighborhoods, where more vehicles are likely to be delinquent 
                                                            
195 Erin Cox, supra note 188. 
196 Interview with Roger Palmer, supra note 147. 
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Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).   
198 Interview with Roger Palmer, supra note 147. 




and where residents use on-street parking rather than closed garages.
200
  In addition, the average 
tax due on motor vehicles in New Haven – around $270 – is high enough to be a burden for 
many, but not so high as to be a significant source of city revenue.
201
  Residents may question the 
worth of using private collectors because the amounts involved are low from the government’s 
perspective, while at the same time believing that the small amounts impose significant hardship 
upon them and their neighbors.
202
   
On a more practical level, the additional fees paid to the towing companies anger 
many.
203
   Public perception of these contract towers is, unsurprisingly, negative.  Their mistakes 
and mishaps are reported in the local papers with great glee – especially when it turns out that 
they owe back taxes on the very trucks that they use to tow other tax delinquents.
 204
 The 
bootfinder program was suspended for a period in 2008 after public complaint about politically 
connected State Marshalls and incidents in which cars were mistakenly towed.
205
  Since 
reopening the program, the city has taken steps to make the towing process less frustrating by 
reducing tow fees
206
 and allowing towers to collect taxes on behalf of City Hall instead of 
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201 Id.  
202 Interview with Roger Palmer, supra note 147.  
203 In addition to back taxes (and current taxes if the bills for that year have gone out), New Haven’s delinquent 
taxpayers must pay a $77 tow fee or a $55 boot fee, and a storage fee if their car is in the impound lot for more than 
24 hours.   
204 Melissa Bailey, Bootfinder Booted, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, April 13, 2009, available at 
http://newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/bootfinder_booted/. 
205 Paul Bass, Towing Program Halted, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, Apr. 11, 2008 available at 
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forcing them to wait until business hours to pay at the tax collector’s office.
207
  Overall, however, 
New Haven has been unwilling to be less aggressive in its tax collection efforts.   
 When Mayor DeStefano insists upon aggressive vehicle tax collection, his rationale is 
that New Haven needs the revenue, and that everyone should be made to pay their fair share of 
the tax.
 208
  Indeed, there is good reason to worry about low collection rates: there is a chance that 
any tax morale gains brought on by softer collection policies would be erased by higher rates of 
tax evasion.  Belief that their neighbors are getting away without paying tax both lowers 
residents’ motivation to pay and lowers their morale if they do pay.
209
  Mayor DeStefano, who is 
probably in the best position to know, apparently believes that the high collections rate on motor 
vehicles is worth the political cost.     
He does recognize, however, that the tax causes problems for New Haven.  It is 
expensive to administer.  New Haven has approximately 27,000 parcels of land to track, but 
about 85,000 vehicles are on the grand list and supplemental list each year.
210
  Tracking vehicles 
and sending out tax bills takes up time and effort that would perhaps be better used in improving 
the real property tax, which provides so much more revenue for the city.  According to Gian-Carl 
Casa, director of the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities, “In our community I think about 
70 percent of our effort is spent collecting the motor vehicle tax which generates about seven 
percent of our revenue.  If it were a manufacturing line, you would discontinue it.”
 211
 In Mayor 
                                                            
207 Thomas MacMillian, Towing Companies, Prize Contract Breaks the Law, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, May 18, 
2010, available at 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/towing_companies_city_is_breaking_the_law/ 
208 Holtz, Tax Collector Hits the Road, supra note 134; see also Thomas MacMillian, List: Boot Assessor, Send Info 
Before Deadline, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, Nov. 23, 2010, available at 
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209 TORGLER, supra note 145, at 50. 
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DeStefano’s words, “I'd certainly love to lose the auto tax.  It's the lowest collection rate.  It's the 
hardest to keep track of…. we'd like to see it go.”
212
 
3. Tax Morale and Local Solutions to the Vehicle Tax 
 
At first glance, the vehicle tax’s many problems may seem to point to abolishing it 
entirely.  Those factors that cause local dissatisfaction may also point to levying vehicle taxes at 
a state-wide uniform rate.  However, all taxes result in taxpayer dissatisfaction, and the 
benefits/tax ratio analysis above also suggests a third way of resolving some of the vehicle tax’s 
most persistent problems.  Currently, Connecticut law mandates that vehicles and real property 
be taxed at the same rate.
213
  However, if local governments could choose whether or not to levy 
a vehicle tax, or could choose to set vehicle tax rates independent of real property tax rates, they 
would be able to adjust their tax systems to maximize the benefits/tax ratios of their residents.  
Since the vehicle tax is primarily a local public good, this move would also insure that the level 
of government bearing the benefits and burdens of the tax would be the same level of 
government with the power to set and control it.   
Allowing towns to set different rates for vehicle taxes than for real property is hardly 
unprecedented.  It would essentially reinstitute the classified property scheme described in Part I 
Section C and championed by Simeon Leland and others scholars as a solution to the inequities 
of the general property tax.
214
   By giving local governments increased control over the tax, it 
would echo the old practice of de facto classification via state-sanctioned underassessment,  
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presumably without the favoritism and inequality that result from that practice.
215
    
There is also good reason to believe that communities have different overall benefits/tax 
ratios when it comes to the vehicle tax, and that local governments are in the best position to 
discover those ratios.  The vehicle tax may not be as hated, or as burdensome, in towns with 
lower mill rates and less aggressive collection.  Towns could also take steps to make the tax less 
hated – for example by tweaking the collection and notification process, or by earmarking all 
vehicle tax revenue generated for road work or road-related police services.
216
 Differences in 
wealth and the rate of vehicle ownership may also affect the way residents view the tax.  For 
example, in Greenwich, Connecticut, a town which in 2006 had more vehicles than people, and 
was home in to 94 Ferraris, 65 Maseratis, 39 Rolls Royces and 3,769 BMWs, the vehicle tax 
may act more as a luxury tax than in other towns.
217
 Even in New Haven the tax may have appeal 
to some residents: for example, New Haven having long ago lost the battle to tax dormitories,
 218
 
vehicle taxes may be the only local taxes that a substantial portion of Yale students pay.
219
 
Moreover, the revenue effects of changing the car tax may be different in different localities.  In 
some, a reduction in vehicle taxes may actually lead to increased revenue if residents respond by 
buying more and newer cars.
220
 
                                                            
215 Id. at 423 (setting out in table form a list of all classification amendments to state constitutions from 1900 to 
1928). 
216 In the past, tax officials have suggested that the vehicle tax would be better received by the public if it were 
turned into something closer to a user fee, by restricting the revenue from the tax to road-related services.  See 
Report of the Tax Commissioner for Biennial Period 1909 and 1910, supra note 85. 
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Communities are likely to take advantage of the ability to tax vehicles at a different rate, 
with some reducing or eliminating the tax and others raising it.  In Alaska, Texas, and Louisiana 
where vehicle taxes are now optional at the local level, most jurisdictions appear not to levy the 
tax.
221
  Last year, as a result of its budget crisis, Rhode Island repealed a provision under which 
the first $6000 of every vehicle was exempt from local tax.
222
  It gave local governments the 
option of either keeping the exemption or doing away with it, effectively raising the rate at which 
vehicles were taxed.
223
   As of last July, nine Rhode Island municipalities had opted to keep the 
full exemption, thirteen repealed it, five cut it in half, and two cut it down to a credit of $2500 or 
less.
224
  In other instances, localities tax vehicles at higher rates than real property when given 
the opportunity.   Connecticut’s current uniform rate provision was put in place in 1958 after a 
court case revealed that the town of Bristol regularly taxed all real estate at fifty percent of its 
value, business personal property at ninety percent of its value, and motor vehicles at one 
hundred percent of their value.
225
   Currently, New Haven essentially taxes vehicles at a slightly 
higher rate because it has, as allowed under state law, frozen property tax assessments at their 
2008 levels.
226
  Most municipalities in Rhode Island and Virginia also have higher vehicle tax 
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rates than real property tax rates.
227
  The fact that localities react differently when give the power 
to raise or lower their vehicle taxes reflects tax morale’s position as a local public good.  
Different localities have different benefit/tax ratios, and even those intrinsic morale-lowing 
aspects of the vehicle tax – such as salience and quick depreciation – operate with different force 
depending upon the demographics and preferences of a locality’s residents.   
4. Downsides to State-Level Reform 
 
Why not solve Connecticut’s vehicle tax problems at the state level?  Nineteen states 
have already done so by doing away with the tax entirely, and another sixteen tax all residents at 
a uniform state-wide rate.
228
  These solutions have been raised multiple times in Connecticut, the 
earliest in 1910, the latest by Governor Rell in 2006 and 2007.
229
  They champion the possibility 
of increasing tax morale by doing away with differences in local rates, thus keeping residents in 
high-tax areas from resenting their large vehicle tax burdens.  However, a state solution to the 
vehicle tax is a blunt instrument: it would either raise taxes in some jurisdictions or reduce 
revenue at a time when budgets are already strained.  For this reason, local governments have 
been reluctant to cede control of the tax, especially since it currently raises about ten percent of 
Connecticut’s local government revenue.
230
  A state solution or state-mandated repeal would also 
hobble local governments in their ability to control benefits/tax ratios.  Doing away with the 
                                                            
227 See State of Rhode Island Department of Revenue, supra note 223; John L. Knapp, What Will Become of the Car 
Tax?, 2006 VA. ISSUES & ANSWERS 29. 
228 See Appendix B; see also John Rappa, OLR Research Report, Statewide Motor Vehicle Property Taxes, Mar.1, 
2010.   
229 Report of the Tax Commissioner for Biennial Period 1909 and 1910, supra note 85, at 63 (positing that state 
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vehicle tax entirely leaves residents with just the real property tax, limiting local government 
flexibility and hurting those jurisdictions in which residents would prefer to pay some amount of 
vehicle tax to higher real property tax rates.  Switching to a state-wide rate likewise either 
decreases the amount of revenue some localities bring in, lowering the benefits they are able to 
provide, or increases the tax rate in some localities.   
In addition, eliminating the vehicle tax without decreasing local government revenue has 
proven almost impossible in Connecticut.  Former Governor Jodi Rell’s 2006 proposal to 
eliminate the tax can serve as an example.
 231
  Governor Rell claimed that her solution was 
revenue neutral, but it involved repealing the state tax property tax credit and giving 
municipalities revenue from the Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan Fund.
232
  Rell clearly 
believed that her proposal was politically popular: proposals to eliminate the vehicle tax had 
been politically advantageous in other states,
233
 and her plan was unveiled at her State of the 
State address, where she made multiple references to how hated Connecticut’s vehicle tax 
was.
234
  Repealing the state property tax credit, then set at a maximum of $350, also doesn’t 
appear to have been a fatal flaw.  The credit, given for both real property taxes paid and for 
vehicle taxes, phases out at a certain income level.
235
  The majority of people  – especially 
renters and high-income homeowners – would have paid less total tax under her plan.  
Municipalities would have saved money and time as well, since they would only have had to 
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track cars owned by businesses.  The problem was that the Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan 
Fund - cleverly renamed under Rell’s bill as the Casino Assistance Revenue (CAR) fund - comes 
from an agreement between Connecticut and its Indian gaming operations and varies directly 
with the amount of slot machine revenue Connecticut’s two Indian casinos take in.  Towns 
lobbied against Rell’s tax cut because they were unwilling to take a gamble on an uncertain 
revenue source, and the state refused to guarantee to step in and make up any future deficits.
236
   
A uniform state-wide tax rate would be easier to implement, and would undoubtedly have 
its advantages.  Such a tax would presumably be easier to administer, since the DMV already 
collects vehicle information.  A uniform rate would also allow for equality of burden across 
municipalities, as well as the possibility of wealth redistribution among towns and cities.  At first 
glance, it seems like New Haven would champion such a move.  Connecticut cities and towns 
are uncommonly dependent upon the property tax, raising less revenue from fees and other 
charges than most local governments.
237
  Furthermore, there is no county-level tax to smooth out 
differences in wealth and property value between urban centers such as New Haven, Hartford 
and Bridgeport and their surrounding suburbs.
238
  The lack of larger taxing jurisdictions also 
makes sales taxes less attractive, as residents could simply drive to a lower-tax area to shop.  
Connecticut cities, so the argument goes, are stuck in a vicious cycle of harmful tax competition 
with the suburbs.  They have lower property values, but need to provide more services than the 
suburbs because their population is poorer and crime rates are higher.  They raise taxes, which 
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causes capital – in the form of businesses and wealthier residents – to flow out to the surrounding 
suburbs.
239
  Property values decline, so tax rates must be pushed higher, and the entire cycle 
begins anew.
 240
  Thus, in a competition for mobile capital, the suburbs benefit every time New 
Haven raises its tax rates, and New Haven is harmed every time the suburbs lower theirs.  As a 
result, the suburbs may seek to undercut New Haven, ignoring the negative externalities of such 
a move because they are diffused among the entire region while the positive results of a low tax 
rate are borne primarily by their residents.   
Taxing vehicles as a way to partially correct this asymmetry has a certain elegance to it, 
since cars play a large role in suburb-city tax competition, spurring the creation of suburbs and 
allowing suburban homeowners to shop and work in cities while living in low tax areas.
241
  Even 
if they believe in race-to-the-bottom tax competition, however, New Haven’s elected officials, 
have good reason to remain reluctant to support a state-wide vehicle tax.
 
  In Connecticut’s 
wealthier cities, a uniform rate would likely lead to reduced local revenue or higher effective tax 
burdens.  For New Haven, the opposite would be true.  However, wealthier Connecticut cities 
currently receive minimal state funding, and are thus somewhat insulated from state budget 
deficits and political battles.
242
  New Haven, on the other hand, already receives significant aid 
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from the state.  Forty-two percent, or approximately $202 million of its general fund comes from 
state sources, to say nothing of the approximately $70 million in special purpose grants that it is 
expected to receive from the state this fiscal year.
243
  As a result, the city is at the mercy of state 
finances and state legislative battles, constantly looking to the General Assembly for assurances 
that its redistribution programs be fully funded.
 244
  With Connecticut currently facing a $3.67 
billion budget deficit and reducing PILOT payouts, New Haven is understandably reluctant to 
give up a local revenue source, even if it were slated to receive increased state revenue in 
exchange.
 245
  Instead, its elected officials are focusing on new state or regional taxes as a way to 
bring more money into New Haven.
246
   
There is another reason for local governments to be leery of having the state take over 
vehicle tax administration.  No state that administers a vehicle tax allows local government to set 
their own vehicle tax rates, likely because local differences are part of the problem states hope to 
solve.
 247
  However, even if the state were to allow local governments to set their own tax rates, 
state administration would likely bring more scrutiny to bear on the vehicle tax.  The tax-benefits 
link provided at the local level is more attenuated at the state level, with the result that residents 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
available at 
http://greenwichct.virtualtownhall.net/Public_Documents/GreenwichCT_Estimate/bet_Final_Town_Budget_2010-
2011.pdf.   
243 BUDGET FY 2010-2011, § 2-7 and § 5-4.   
244 See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND 90-95 (discussing the effects that a high amount of state 
aid has had on Boston, Massachusetts).  
245 Christine Stuart, Malloy Slices New Haven’s Budget Gap by $11M, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, Feb. 9, 2011, 
available at 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/malloy_slices_new_havens_budget_gap_by_11m/ 
246 New Haven’s legislative agenda, as set out in the FY 2010-2011 budget, includes lobbying for a state-wide real 
property tax. BUDGET FY 2010-2011, § 1-14 to 1-15.  In addition, Mayor DeStefano is currently working with the 
Connecticut South Central Council of Governments, suggesting regional sales and income taxes.   
247 See Appendix B.  In Kansas, however, the state collects the vehicle tax, but the rate varies by county, based on 
the average tax rate in all taxing jurisdictions across that county.  Kan. Stats. Ann. § 79-5105.  See also Scott 




often view state taxes as more burdensome than local ones.
248
  In other words, the aggregate 
local-state benefits/tax ratio of residents would decrease simply because the state and not 
localities were administering the tax (though it would likely increase in those localities where the 
new state-wide rate was lower than the previous local rate).  Moreover, local politics are 
generally less partisan and less hotly contested than state politics, and making a tax as 




In the late 1990s, a period of budget surplus, multiple states were considering reducing or 
eliminating vehicle taxes.
250
  Those who reduced the tax and had their state government 
reimburse towns for the gap in revenue have found themselves mired in controversy.  The 
vehicle tax that was such a divisive topic in the 2003 California recall election was a uniform 
state-collected tax with revenues going to local governments.  In 1998, California had instituted a 
phase-out of its tax, reimbursing municipalities for their lost revenue.  However, the law 
included a proviso saying that such reimbursement could be discontinued if the state faced 
budget shortfalls.  Governor Gray Davis was faced with mounting debt but unable to easily 
increase taxes because of Proposition 13 and California’s referendum system.  He canceled the 
                                                            
248 TORGLER, supra note 145, at 70-79 (summarizing research on tax morale and direct democracy).  
249 See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1999). 
250 South Carolina, Kansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Utah, California, Virginia, Missouri, Rhode Island and 
Washington State all had campaigns to reduce or eliminate the vehicle tax during this period.  See Craft & Schmidt, 
supra note 115, at 697.  In South Carolina, Kansas, Kentucky, Virginia, Missouri and Rhode Island the tax was 
locally collected at local rates.  In Utah and California it was locally collected at a uniform state rate.  See Appendix 
B.  Washington succeeded in eliminating the tax entirely.  Rhode Island’s tax was going to phase out beginning in 
2005, but that provision was repealed before it could take effect.  2005 R.I. Pub. Laws 117. A South Carolina bill 
that would have eliminated the vehicle tax by 2011 passed the South Carolina House, but stalled in the Senate.  See 
Reduction in Car Tax Hot Topic, AUGUSTA CHRON., Apr. 19, 1998, available at 
http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/1998/04/19/met_226384.shtml.   In 1994, Connecticut too passed legislation 
lessening the vehicle tax by giving motor vehicle tax credits on income tax returns.  The provision never took effect, 
however.  It was supposed to phase in starting in 1997, but was eliminated after the General Assembly passed other 
tax relief measures, including a reduction in the state gas tax and the current property tax credit, covering both 
vehicles and primary residences. CONN. GEN. STAT. Sec 12-704, repealed by 1997 Ct. P.A. 309. The credit has 




phase-out, bringing vehicle taxes up to their pre-1998 levels.
251
  The vehicle tax then became the 
focal point for those campaigning against him.
252
   
In 1998, following through on a campaign pledge by Governor Gilmore, Virginia also 
began to reduce its vehicle tax, making the first $20,000 of each vehicle exempt and giving state 
money to local governments to make up for the lost revenue.
253
  Political controversy followed 
soon after, when the state faced budget shortfalls in 2002 triggering a provision that halted 
scheduled reductions in the tax.
254
  In short, loss aversion across an entire state, set in a larger 
and more fractious political landscape, makes raising vehicle taxes at the state level a dangerous 
proposition.  As a result, local governments may receive more revenue in the long run if they 
keep the tax and its headaches for themselves.  Indeed, many of the states that levied a state-level 
tax or fee in the 1930s now have no vehicle tax at all today.
255
  Local control over the tax, then, 
seems more likely to lead to reforms and rate changes that maximize residents’ benefits/tax ratios.  
In addition, as discussed immediately below, although locally-controlled rates may lead to tax 
competition, they may not necessarily lead to harmful tax competition.      
C. The Vehicle Tax versus the Real Property Tax as a Local Revenue Source  
 
                                                            
251 Hiltzik supra, note 2.  
252 Id.  
253 Spencer S. Hsu, Va. Car-Tax Fear: Cut Now, Pay Later, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1998, at B1.   
254 See Knapp, supra note 227, at 27.  See also Rosalind S. Helderman, Kaine May Renew Virginia’s Car Tax 
Debate Amid Budget Gap, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/16/AR2009121604072.html.  Note that the effect of tax reductions may cause another 
problem for those states with reimbursement policies: if the reduced tax burden causes residents to buy more and 
newer cars, then states may end up paying far more in reimbursement dollars than they anticipated.  See Craft & 
Schmidt, supra note 115 at 698.  
255 In 1930 Idaho, Iowa, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, and North Dakota were the only states that levied 
state-wide fees in lieu of the general property tax.  Only Iowa currently has a tax.  Also, of the nineteen states that 
levied no motor vehicle taxes in 1957, only four have switched back to having a tax.  Two of those states, Michigan 
and Minnesota, keep the tax for state use instead of remitting it to localities.  Iowa keeps sixty percent of the vehicle 
tax for itself, giving the other forty percent to counties and municipalities.  Louisiana has made the tax optional for 
local governments. See Appendix B.  For information on the states that levied a vehicle tax in 1957, see Bird, supra 




Part II Section B already surveyed the similarities and differences between the real 
property tax and the vehicle tax from a tax morale perspective.  The following section will offer 
a comparison from a local finance perspective, focusing on the role local taxation plays in public 
service provision.  Instead of the story of race-to-the-bottom tax competition outlined above, 
scholars who champion local taxation view it as a vehicle to keep local governments accountable 
in its service provision.  They concede that redistribution of wealth is best done at the state or 
federal level
256
 – essentially the position New Haven is in now thanks to state PILOT programs 
and grants for education.
257
  They claim, however, that local taxation to provide local services 
promotes Tieboutian race to the top tax competition and allows residents to better police local 
government programs.
258
   
In this story, built upon the Tiebout model and championed by scholars Bruce Hamilton, 
Wallace Oates, and William Fischel, cities and towns compete against one another for residents, 
with people choosing to live in the area that has the package of goods and services that best suits 
them.
259
  Local governments respond to voter preference on tax rates and service provision 
because they know that inefficiencies or rent-seeking will lead residents to either exit their 
jurisdiction or vote them out of office.
260
  Allowing local governments to provide services but 
                                                            
256 See e.g., WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 131-40 (1972); Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Federalism, in 
PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE 155, 160-61 (James M. Buchanan 
& Richard A. Musgrave eds., 1999).   
257 See supra note 128 and related text.   
258 See generally PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE (Wallace E. Oates ed, 2001).  See also 
McGuire, supra note 237.   
259Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).  Bruce W. 
Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUDIES 205 (1975) (using 
zoning and property taxation to prevent fiscal freeriding).  Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and 
Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 
77 J. POL. ECON. 957 (1969) (showing that differences in local government spending are capitalized into home 
values).  FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 155 (arguing that local government decisions are 
driven in large part by homeowners protecting their property values).     
260 See, e.g., Oates, Effects of Property Taxes, supra note 259; Oates, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 




receive revenue from the state, however, tends to undercut the political force of this local exit 
and voice.
261
  If too much funding comes from the state, then local governments will negotiate 
with higher levels of government to receive more funding instead of weighing the costs of 
services against their benefits.
262
  Local governments also tend to increase their spending more 
when given grants than when given an equivalent increase in local tax revenue.
263
  In addition, 




Because some redistribution is necessary to provide services to those who cannot afford 
to pay for them, and because services often create spillover effects, most proponents of local 
taxation favor some level of state grants.  They contend, however, that municipalities will be 
more efficient in their service provision and more responsive to local concerns if they raise 
enough revenue from local sources to cause their residents to police marginal spending decisions 
and tax increases or decreases.
 265
  The question, of course, is how much local taxation is optimal, 
and whether certain services – public schools especially – should be funded by state sources 
because of equity concerns.
266
   
                                                            
261 Oates, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development, supra note 260, at 238, citing ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).  
262 Oates, Property Taxation and Local Government Finance, supra note 155 at 24; see also, Oates, Fiscal 
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263 This “flypaper effect” may be in part explained by lack of salience in grant funding.  See Oates, On the Nature, 
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264 Oates, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development, supra note 260, at 241.   
265 See e.g., Oates, Property Taxation and Local Government, supra note 155, at 26-27. 
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There is a caveat to this view of local taxation, however, and that is that not all local taxes 
are created equal.  To be effective in constraining local governments and policing levels of 
service provision, local taxes should be non-distortionary and should closely approximate 
benefits taxes.
267
   Benefits taxes are levies in which a resident’s tax burden is proportionate to 
the benefits he or she receives from the government.  Equity in this context means that people 
who receive the same value of services are taxed the same, not that people with the same ability 
to pay are taxed the same.
268
  This link between payment and service provision promotes 
government efficiency by allowing residents to see how much public goods and services cost 
them.
269
  If a tax increase does not provide an equal or greater benefits increase (or, put in 
slightly different terms, if the numerator in the benefits-tax ratio does not increase more than the 
denominator) then residents will protest.  Scholar’s descriptions of colonial taxation, where men 
were taxed by the head for the protection afforded them and property was taxed for the 
protection afforded it, is an example of a broad benefits tax.
270
  Motorists in the 1940s protesting 
the use of highway funds for general purposes is a more fine-grained example: they were 
unwilling to bear a special tax burden unless they also received a special tax benefit in the form 
of more and better roads.
271
 
1. The Property Tax as a Benefits Tax 
 
In evaluating the vehicle tax as a source of local revenue, it once again makes sense to 
compare it to the only other local tax that New Haven residents pay – the real property tax.  The 
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question from the local finance perspective then becomes whether one acts as a better benefits 
tax than the other, or whether the two complement each other to provide a more complete 
benefits tax package than either would alone.   The quintessential local benefits tax (and the one 
used by Tiebout in his original article) is the poll tax.
272
  The tax acts as an “entrance fee” into 
the community, and every resident pays equally for an equal amount of goods and services.
273
  
In his 1928 indictment of the general property tax, Simeon Leland makes the case for the 
property tax as a benefits tax: 
 “Turning from the measure of ability to the obligation to pay for benefits received, 
property becomes a more satisfactory measure.  Though the benefit theory has been 
discarded as worthless by many writers of public finance, nevertheless it cannot be 
thrown aside altogether.  Under local governments many benefits are conferred directly 
on property by public expenditures.  These benefits often not only enhance the value of 
the property but frequently add to its net return.  In such cases it is only just that the 
government recoup itself for these benefits from the property on the owners thereof.”
274
 
Indeed, part of the reason why the colonial tax system gave way to taxation according to full 
value in the early 1800s was the ability of government services to raise property values by 
building canals and other improvements, and by providing services such as city fire brigades.
275
   
Modern scholars – most notably Wallace Oates and William Fischel – have reinvigorated 
and built upon the benefit theory, arguing that in a community with sufficient zoning to prevent 
fiscal freeriding property taxes are a payment for 1) benefits in the form of goods and services 
provided by the government and 2) benefits in the form of increasing property values attributable 
to government services.
 276
   In this simple model, the property tax is efficient and creates no 
deadweight loss, as those who pay more in tax receive correspondingly higher amounts of 
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benefit in the form of capitalization.
277
  Homeowners – who have a vested interest in ensuring 
that their property values rise – closely police local government though the political process.
278
  
Their benefits/tax ratio revolves around their home, which is usually by far their largest asset: 
even if a homeowner does not directly benefit from a service he will nevertheless support an 
increase in funding if it raises his property value by more than the marginal increase in property 
taxes.
279
  The municipality thus becomes the equivalent of a corporation, with “homevoters” as 
its stockholders.
280
   
2. Downsides to the Property Tax 
 
Other views of the real property tax are less sanguine.  Some scholars argue that the tax is 
a distortionary tax on capital.
281
  If it were sufficiently distortionary, its ability to lead to efficient 
service provision would be destroyed.
282
  Cities would underprovide services for fear that taxing 
capital would cause it to flee to lower-tax areas or cause people to spend less developing 
property than they otherwise would.
283
  In New Haven’s case there are other problems as well.  
First, New Haven may be especially sensitive to distortionary taxes on capital since it has a large 
non-profit sector, allowing capital to stay in the city but still escape taxation.  Second, the 
property-tax-as-benefits-tax theory was developed and is discussed largely with the suburbs in 
mind.
284
  The link between property values and government services that it champions depends 
upon the median voter model and upon homeowners jealously guarding their property values and 
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restricting new housing so that services will be capitalized into home values instead of spread to 
new developments.
285
 Studies have shown, however, that the median voter model does not work 
as well in cities as it does in the suburbs.
286
   
The property tax may also falter as a benefits tax in cities because many urban residents 
rent.
287
  As discussed in Part II, Section 2BII, the real property tax is not salient for renters, and 
is a function not just of tax rates and home values but also of how much tax is shifted to renters 
from their landlords.
288
  Rental prices may not respond to government service provision in the 
same way that property values do.
 289
  Even if they did, renters might not champion services that 
led to higher housing values, as they have a vested interest in keeping their rent payments low.
290
  
As a result, when a significant portion of the community rents, the real property tax does not act 
as an entrance fee into the community, nor does it give renters reason to scrutinize the level and 
type of services government is providing them.   
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3. The Vehicle Tax as a Benefits Tax for Renters 
 
For renters, the vehicle tax may act as a better benefits tax than the real property tax.  Its 
salience, one of the tax’s biggest vices when considering tax morale, turns to a virtue in the 
benefits tax context.  Also, the vehicle tax clearly has the ability to rouse apathetic residents, and 
should in theory rouse renters just as much if not more than homeowners.  In fact, the vehicle tax 
is a common local government tax in Italy and other countries in part because of its ability to 
function as an entrance fee into the community.
291
   
The lack of politically engaged renters is troubling for two reasons.  First, the presence of 
renters in a community may decrease the efficiency of local government service provision.
292
  
Either lack of salience leads renters to ignore the link between their rent and local government 
services, or their local tax burden is low as compared to homeowners, because they consume less 
housing and thus engage in fiscal freeriding.
293
  Either cause leads to the same result: 
municipalities with a large bloc of renters tend to spend more on local service provision.
294
  
Second, when homeowners vote and renters do not, local officials are more likely to pass 
regulations favoring homeowners at the expense of renters.  If renters’ political silence is a result 
of relative satisfaction with service provision – a natural result if they are truly paying less for 
the same services as renters – then their lack of voice is mostly harmless, although still troubling 
                                                            
291 Federico Revelli & Edoardo Di Porto, Central Command, Local Hazard, and the Race to the Top, University of 
Turin Working Paper Series (2009) “[D]ue to the high visibility of vehicle taxes and the widespread ownership of 
motor vehicles, vehicle taxation can work as a signal of a government’s quality and competence, and could therefore 
foster accountability and yardstick competition between decentralized governments.” Khairul Mahadi et al., 
Provincial Motor Vehicle Taxation in Indonesia, 29 BULL. INDONESIAN ECON. STUDIES 95 (1993).   
292 Oates, Property Taxation and Local Government Spending: The Renter Effect, supra note 169.      
293 According to Oates, renters’ lower tax burden could be caused by the fact that they on average consume less 
housing than homeowners and thus are engaging in a form of fiscal freeriding.  See Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 
Renters’ illusion or savvy?, 11 PUB. FIN. QUARTERLY 237 (1983). It could also be that their tax burden for services 
is lower than homeowners because of low amounts of tax increases being shifted to them from landlords.  See 
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from a democratic perspective.  However, there may be other consequences to renter silence.  
For example, there may be social consequences to having local politics be dominated by 
homeowners.  If poor and minority residents are more likely to rent while homeowners are likely 
to be white and middle or upper class, then the concerns of minority and low-income residents 
may not receive much attention.  Moreover, homeowners of all income levels and nationalities 
will want to maximize their property values, which may lead them all to vote the preferences of 
the stereotypical (white, middle class) homeowner.
295
   
The vehicle tax may have value as an entrance fee into the community and thus as a way 
to incentivize broader supervision of local government service provision.
 296
  However, the tax is 
still lacking the other characteristics of a good local tax – non-distortionary character and a link 
between amount of tax burden and the amount of services.  Vehicle taxes are likely to be highly 
distortionary, since residents can choose to not own cars, or simply to own older, cheaper cars in 
response to tax increases.
297
  This would allow residents to escape or reduce their tax burden 
instead of becoming involved in local politics, partially erasing the virtues of the tax.  Vehicle 
value is also unlikely to correlate well with services received, especially since vehicles 
depreciate so rapidly.  Also, while the vehicle tax may make for a better poll tax equivalent than 
the real property tax, there is no capitalization of services into vehicle value.  Tax payments and 
benefits may not be well correlated.  Moreover, in Fischel’s view the power of the property tax 
to rouse residents comes not only from its ability to act as an entrance fee but also from the fact 
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that homeownership gives residents the ability to enjoy upside gain from government policies.
298
  
Political involvement to protect or raise the value of your home may be inherently more 
productive than political involvement brought about by a desire to lower taxes.  Unfortunately, 
no studies have attempted to compare service provision or rates of renter political involvement in 
municipalities with a local vehicle tax versus without, or in localities where a vehicle tax has 
been recently reduced or increased.   It is quite possible, however, that since car values do not 
increase in response to local government action, renters will concentrate their efforts on 
eliminating or evading the tax instead of on policing service provision.   
When evaluating the vehicle tax as a source of local revenue, then, the first question is 
whether the tax, in combination with the real property tax, leads to more efficient service 
provision by approximating a benefits tax for renters.  Empirical research is needed, especially 
since the number and type of renters in a community may affect how much a vehicle tax acts as a 
benefits tax.  The next question is whether any efficiency gain brought about by the tax is worth 
the concomitant drag on tax morale and the administrative expense associated with levying and 
collecting the tax.
299
  The answer to this question may differ across localities, though it seems to 
be answered in the affirmative in at least some communities.
300
  As a result, local governments 
should be allowed to vary their vehicle tax rate from their real property tax rate, or to decrease 
the vehicle tax rate to zero.   
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There is one final consideration, however: that of equity.  Taxing vehicles in order to 
create a community entrance fee for renters is essentially an argument that we should tax renters 
for their own good – or for the good of the community as a whole.  But because it is predicated 
upon benefits taxation, the argument ignores the fact that the vehicle tax is likely to 
disproportionately burden low income residents.
301
  It also ignores the fact that a vehicle tax may 
price low-income residents out of the vehicle market, undermining their ability to choose the 
jurisdiction that has their preferred mix of taxes and services.
302
  In addition, some scholars 
would argue that allowing localities to set their own tax rates would lead to race-to-the bottom 
tax competition
303




Simeon Leland and others envisioned classification as a way to discourage evasion and 
unfairness by taxing personal property less than real property.
305
  However, if homeowners 
dominate local politics and would rather spread the tax burden to renters than have higher 
property taxes, they would likely able to prevail against the interests of renters and raise the 
vehicle tax.  This political triumph of homeowners over renters may be inequitable if one is 
concerned about taxpayers’ ability to pay, since renters tend to have lower incomes.
306
  (Raising 
vehicle tax rates may lead to greater equity, however, in the benefits tax context.  If renters pay 
                                                            
301 See supra note 166 and related text.   
302 If low-income renters are priced out of the car market, their lack of transportation may force them to live in urban 
areas where jobs are close by.  This effect would strengthen the agglomeration effects already thought to be at work 
for the urban poor, who would not find the services they needed in less-dense suburban areas.  See Schleicher, supra 
note 286, at 1536-37. 
303 See supra note 239 and related text.   
304 Wallace Oates and others dispute the race-to-the-bottom theory of tax competition.  See supra note 258 and 
related text.  In addition, there is good evidence that zoning laws act as an effective means of preventing renters 
from living in particular areas, making it a more effective barrier to entry than the vehicle tax is likely to be.  See, e.g. 
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 155, at 54-57. 
305 Id. at 39.   




less in tax for the same services as homeowners, and the gain in property values does not make 
up for the extra tax that homeowners pay, then renters have an unfair advantage.)    
However, since most homeowners also own cars, since high vehicle taxes would decrease 
tax morale, and since the tax is distortionary, rates are unlikely to rise precipitously.  In Rhode 
Island, where localities control the vehicle tax and can divorce vehicle mill rates from real 
property mill rates, most municipalities have higher mill rates for vehicles.
307
   Other states with 
local levies often assess both classes of property at the same rate, but apply the tax to a lower 
portion of residential property value than motor vehicle value, with the result that real property 
bears less of the tax burden than vehicles do.
308
   
In short, allowing greater local control of the vehicle tax may lead to higher tax rates in 
some localities, thus burdening renters more.  However, it may also lead to more efficient local 
service provision, a greater renter stake in local politics, and more flexibility for local 
government, which can in turn increase the benefits/tax ratio of their residents.  Given existing 
state and federal redistribution of wealth, as well as the state property tax credit, allowing local 
control of the vehicle tax is worth the equity cost.   
                                                            
307 See Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation, Rhode Island 2008-2009 Municipal Tax Rates, 
http://www.riedc.com/data-and-publications/municipal-tax-rates#3_key.  In some municipalities the difference is 
less than ten mills.  In others, it is considerably more.  Central Falls, for example, has a real property mill rate of 
10.54 and a motor vehicle mill rate of 48.65.   
308 In Georgia, motor vehicle rates are tied to the previous year’s real property tax rate.  See Georgia Department of 
Revenue, Local Government Services Division, https://etax.dor.ga.gov/ptd/cds/csheets/millrate.aspx.  In Alabama, 
real property and motor vehicle rates are the same, but are applied to 15% of motor vehicle and 10% for owner-
occupied homes.  Alabama law also gives each homeowner a homestead exemption, with the result that real 
property bears less tax burden that real property. Alabama Department of Revenue, Property Tax, 
http://www.revenue.alabama.gov/advalorem/other/caltax.html   In Missouri, real property and personal property 
rates are the same, but vehicles are taxed on 33.3% of their value and residential property on 19%.  See State of 
Missouri, State Tax Commission Definitions, http://www.stc.mo.gov/definitions.htm.  Similarly, in Mississippi, 
rates are the same for real property and motor vehicles, but real property is assessed at 10% of its value and vehicles 
at 30%.  State of Mississippi, Department of Revenue, Ad Valorem Tax, 
http://www.dor.ms.gov/taxareas/property/advalor.html.  North Carolina also uses a uniform rate, but assesses 
residences at 4% of their value and personal property at 10.5%. South Carolina Department of Revenue, Property 




Part III: Implementing Local Control 
 
The Connecticut General Statutes state that, “Each…municipality shall assess all 
property for purposes of the local property tax at a uniform rate of seventy per cent of present 
true and actual value...”
309
  Each taxing district levies a single rate for all the property in its 
district.  However, those towns with two or more taxing districts have an affirmative grant from 
the legislature to treat motor vehicles differently, giving some Connecticut towns clear statutory 
authority to divorce their vehicle tax rate from their property tax rate.  Section 12-122a of the 
Connecticut General Statutes, enacted in 1974, states that “[a]ny municipality which has more 
than one taxing district may by a majority vote of its legislative body set a uniform city-wide 
mill rate for taxation of motor vehicles.”  Currently, eight Connecticut municipalities have 
multiple districts, while the remaining 161 do not.  Varying the mill rate achieves the same effect 
as varying the percentage of property valuation: some property is taxed more heavily than other 
property.  Yet, it was presumably inconvenient, and seemed unjust, to tax half the city one 
vehicle tax rate and the other half another.  Also, the same colonial spirit that led people to house 
their cattle outside of town on listing day would surely also lead some present-day taxpayers to 
claim residency on one side of town rather than the other.
310
  The General Statutes say nothing 
about cities with only one taxing district.  The legislature likely thought that cities would chose a 
uniform motor vehicle mill rate that fell between or close to the real property tax rate in their two 
districts.     
That is not, however, how the law has been interpreted, at least by Stamford and Norwalk.  
Stamford currently has several taxing districts with mill rates ranging from 15.68 to 16.82 and a 
                                                            
309 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-62a(b). 
310 For Connecticut residents, vehicle taxes are taxed to the locality in which you reside.  For non-residents, the 




car tax rate of 26.5.
311
  Norwalk taxes real property at mill rates from 18.850 to 20.517, and has a 
car tax rate of 25.168.  Since the legislature has given affirmative approval for motor vehicles to 
be taxed at different rates when more than one taxing district exists in a municipality, in theory 
every Connecticut municipality could either set up a shell tax district or split their town into 
multiple districts and specify that real property rates would be uniform across all districts.
312
  
Towns would then be free to create their own motor vehicle mill rate.  However, taxpayers could 
bring action in Superior Court, challenging the new rates as against state statute.  In addition, the 
state would likely object if New Haven ever tried to implement such a scheme.  The state 
reimburses New Haven for the motor vehicle tax that New Haven forgives under the distressed 
municipalities program.  This program, meant to encourage manufacturing and construction,
 
allows New Haven to exempt from taxation the vehicles of certain developers and businesses.
 313 
 
The state has objected to similar plans by Stamford and New London to create shell business 
personal property taxing districts on the ground that, by taxing personal property at higher rates 
than real property, both cities had been reimbursed by the state at a higher rate than called for 
under the distressed municipalities program.
314
  The safest course of action for New Haven, 
                                                            
311 Intergovernmental Policy Division, Office of Policy and Management, supra note 176. 
312 Note that vehicles registered out of state are taxed as personal property rather than motor vehicles.  If the 
personal property rate and motor vehicle rate were different, as they are in Stamford, then non-residents and 
residents would be taxed differently.  The state may have to amend its laws to avoid a dormant commerce clause 
challenge to its tax laws.       
313 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-9s, supra note 313. 
314 New London and Stamford have both tried to set up shell tax districts in the past, hoping to 
create higher tax rates for business personal property.  However, unlike vehicle taxes, the 
Connecticut General Statutes are silent business personal property taxation across districts.  The 
State Office of Policy and Management claimed that the districts went against legislative intent. 
Stamford asked the Connecticut Attorney General for an opinion, and he found that the statutes 
were unclear.
 
Op. Att’y Gen. (Feb. 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.ct.gov/AG/cwp/view.asp?A=1770&Q=310324 (“CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-148(c) is silent on whether 
municipalities may establish different mill rates for personal and real property within a municipal tax or sub tax 
district. Additionally, this office has found no court cases interpreting or providing guidance on this issue.”).   On 
the one hand, powers of taxation rest with the state, not municipalities.  Pepin v. City of Danbury, 368 




therefore, is to lobby the General Assembly to allow Connecticut’s municipalities to institute a 
classified property tax.   
Conclusion 
 
  Since colonial times, the personal property tax has been relatively easy to evade.  Since 
personalty is easily comparable across taxing jurisdictions, residents have always had an 
incentive to either move their property to low-tax districts or hide it.  As a result, states largely 
gave up on collecting personal property taxes from their residents, either doing away with the tax 
entirely or leaving it to local governments.     
Motor vehicles are both the last of residents’ personal property taxed in most states, and 
the category of personalty most amenable to taxation.  They are registered, high value, and 
relatively easy to track.  Although they create a drag on tax morale, especially in localities like 
New Haven with high tax rates and aggressive collection practices, they also open up the 
possibility for increased benefits/tax ratios, allowing local governments to optimize the tax 
burden between cars and homes.  They may also increase local government efficiency and 
incentivize renter participation in local affairs by acting – albeit imperfectly – as a benefits tax.  
In short, there is perhaps a reason the tax has survived this long.  However, Connecticut’s local 
governments do not currently have the flexibility that they need in order to best harness the tax.  
If they had the power to tax vehicles at a different rate than real property, or to stop levying the 
vehicle tax altogether, they would be in a better position to create an optimal mix of taxes and 
services for their residents.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that municipal property taxes are “a local matter, 
concerning which home rule charter provisions are controlling.” Caulfield v. Noble, 178 Conn. 81, 86-




Appendix A: Tax List of 1648  
Lands, all types 20 shillings per acre 
Houses Special ratings based upon rental value
315
 
Cows, 4+ years old 5 pounds 
Heifers and Steers, 3+ years old 4 pounds 
Heifers and Steers, 2 years old 50 shillings 
Heifers and Steers, 1 year old 30 shillings 
Oxen and bulls, 4+ years old 6 pounds 
Horses 3+ years old 10 pounds 
Mares 3+ years old 12 pounds 
Horses and Mares, 2 years old 5 pounds 10 shillings 
Yew Sheep 1+ year old 30 shillings 
Weather Sheep or Rams 1+year 
old 
16 shillings 
Goats 1+ year old 8 shillings 
Swine 1+ year old 20 shillings 
Asses 1+ year old 40 shillings 
Merchants, Professionals, Artisans Taxed according to their gains 












                                                            
315 Houses were to be “vallewed at a moderate rent” RCNH I, 502, with two model assessments of houses in New 
Haven to serve as a guide.  There was much debate as to whether or not houses should be taxed, and the law 
changed multiple times over the years.  In 1664, Connecticut exempted houses, but in times of war often added the 
tax back.  By 1796, Connecticut had settled on a tax based on the number of fireplaces in a house.  The resulting 
levy, however, formed only a small part of the grand list.   
316 In 1672, however, polls were set into the list of ratable property and taxed along with lands and livestock.  Potter, 
supra note 15, at 139.  














Rate? Code Section Comments 
Delaware N N         
Florida N N         
Idaho N N         
Illinois Gen Prop Tax N         
Maryland N N         
New Jersey N N         
New Mexico N N         
New York N N         
North Dakota N N         
Ohio N N         
Oklahoma N N         
Oregon N N         
Pennsylvania N N         
South Dakota N N         
Tennessee Gen Prop Tax N         




State rate N       Revoked in 1999 
Wisconsin N N         
Alaska 
not yet a state Optional  Local Local ALASKA STAT. § 28.10.431 
Most jurisdictions have none.  
Can be Based on age or value 
Hawaii not yet a state Optional  Local Local HAW. REV. STAT. § 249-2  Taxed by weight, not value 
Louisiana N Optional  Local Local LA. REV. STAT. § 33:2621 Enacted in 2004 
Texas 
Gen Prop Tax Optional  Local  Local TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 502.172  
Approximately 4% of localities 
impose this tax 
                                                            




Alabama Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  ALA. CODE § 40-12-253   
Arkansas Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  ARK. CODE § 26-1-101   
Connecticut Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-71   
Georgia Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  GA. CODE § 48-5-471   
Kansas 
Gen Prop Tax Y Local  County KAN. STAT. ANN.  § 79-5105 
Rate varies by county based on 
average tax rate of all taxing 
jurisdictions in that county  
Kentucky 
Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  
KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 
132.487 Both local and state taxes levied 
Mississippi Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-51   
Missouri 
Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  
MO. REV. STAT. §§137.010; 
137.116   
North Carolina Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-187.2   
Rhode Island Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-34-1    
South Carolina Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-2610   
Virginia 
Gen Prop Tax Y Local  Local  VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3500 
State now reimburses localities 
for a portion of the tax, but does 
so based on rates as they were in 
1997 




collection Y Local  State  
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 36, § 




collection Y Local  State  
MASS. GEN. LAWS, CH. 60A, § 
2   
Montana 
Gen Prop Tax Y Local  State  MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-3-537 
local option vehicle tax, up 
to .7% of value 
Nebraska 
Gen Prop Tax Y Local  State  
NEB. CODE, §§ 60-3, 184-3, 
60-3, 188   
New Hampshire State rate, 
local Y Local State  
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 















collection Y State State  
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-5801; 
ARIZ. CONST., art IX, § II   
California State 
Collection, 
State rate Y State State  
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 
10754; Executive Order S-1-




collection Y State State  COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-3-107 State keeps revenue generated 
Indiana 
Gen Prop Tax Y State State  
IND. CODE §§ 6-6-5-1 to 6-6-
5-10   
Iowa 
N Y  State State  
IOWA CODE §§ 
321. 109;  321. 113   
Michigan 
N Y State State  
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257. 
801 State keeps revenue generated 
Minnesota 
N Y State State  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168. 013 State keeps revenue generated 
Nevada 
Gen Prop Tax Y 
State (local 
option) State  
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 371. 030 
– 371. 060; local option at 
371.045 
State keeps revenue generated.  
Counties can add 1% to finance 
highways if they vote to by 
referendum 
 
 
